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ABSTRACT
In one form or another, small satellites have now been around for fifty years. Serious efforts to commercialize small
satellite technology have commenced far more recently. Plans to commercialize small satellite systems started
somewhat earlier, however such initiatives did not result in hardware being flown until the early 1990s. At this
point, satellite entrepreneurs and engineers have had nearly 20 years to perfect their business plans and system
designs. How have they done? Have the businesses that depended upon this technology been profitable? Have the
satellite systems been successful in meeting their long and short term requirements? Have they done better than
their large space system counterparts?
These questions will be examined from the perspectives of 1) advances in technology unique to small space systems,
2) small vs. large system development methodologies, 3) business success in various market applications and 4) the
ability of small commercial systems to deal with sometimes “unfair” universal constrains imposed upon all space
systems by external sources; some business related.
It is important, in prefacing this topic, to review the salient characteristics of “small” satellite systems as many who
have not worked in this “subculture” of the space community may be surprised to learn that there is more than mass
and power that separate big from small and it is these less obvious differences that are key elements in the ongoing
debate between the true value of small vs. large satellite systems.
Finally, enough trending has been done by now, and enough attempts have been made in the marketplace to reach
some general conclusions in several areas covered by this paper and these observations may possibly be useful in
guiding future entrepreneurs as they approach this apparently illusive market sector. Efforts will be made here to
summarize those findings.
This paper was originally presented at a workshop held at Stanford University, which addressed Emerging
Commercial Applications for Small Satellite Technology. That conference was held March 24, 2009. The paper is
being updated to add new information and changes in outlook since that time. This is the first official publication of
the paper.
times, is that this little joke has been true far too
often…and, just now, there isn’t a lot of investment
capital around…anywhere. Fortunately, there have
been success stories in the commercial space world and
these cases have fueled a fair number of entrepreneurial
initiatives during the last 30 or more years. It’s easy to
review the business success of any venture after it has

1.0 INTRODUCTION: SPACECRAFT ONE AND
ALL (BIG and SMALL)
It’s been a long standing joke in the commercial
satellite world that if you want to make a little money
in selling a hot new space application…well,…you start
with a lot of money. The problem, during these leaner
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been going for awhile. Rate of Return (ROR) and net
present value (NPV) are two awesome task masters
when it comes to checking business success but, we
will stop short of taking this sort of “hard-nosed”
perspective, however, we will ask some tough
questions, none-the-less. But first, perhaps it is worth
trying to focus on the real differences between small
and large satellite systems in terms of technology and
manufacturing methodology as not everyone in the
spacecraft world necessarily believes or understands the
key distinctions between these sectors of the market. In
fact, it should be made clear that some large spacecraft
designers and engineers would not really recognize the
existence of “small satellite” systems as distinct from
spacecraft generally. It begs the question, is a small
satellite just a small satellite?

First we look at the ACS performance of the “best-ofclass” for a group of Microsatellites. While mass and
power might appear to be the most significant
technology hurdles for small spacecraft entering
commercial service, these two parameters have been
counteracted by huge increases in performance of
integrated electronics (in terms of parameters like
MIPS/watt and bits/cm3). Concurrently, the efficiency
of power generation has nearly doubled in 15 years and
the efficiency of RF generation equipment has slowly
increased during that same time. In fact, the limiting
performance subsystem holding back the promise of
small systems has been within the attitude control
regime. Fortunately, suppliers of sensors and actuators
have now emerged and are supplying components
specifically designed for small satellites. The particular
enabling technology of note is the small, low cost
reaction wheel. Reaction wheels along with suitable
Earth and sun sensors and modest-to-high performance
microprocessor system (suitably radiation tolerant), all
taken together, allow pico-, nano-, micro- and miniLEOs to achieve active 3-axis performance. In some
instances advanced sensors such as star trackers, GPS
receivers and inertial measurement units (IMUs) have
now been flown on Microsatellites, Nanosats and
Picosats. Table 1 summarizes the 3-axis stabilized
performance of three Microsatellites among the first to
use reaction wheels along with sun
sensors,
magnetometers and, another novel innovation – cheap
rate gyros (one per axis ; packaged within each wheel).
All three missions were science missions and all were
successful. All were launched within approximately six
months of one another, circa 2003. ChipSat (Cosmic
Hot Interstellar Plasma Spectrometer) was a Berkeley
University instrument (and PI), the platform was
developed by SpaceDev, Inc.
The mission was
sponsored by NASA/GSFC. MOST (Microvariability
and Oscillation of Stars) was a photometric astronomy
mission which identifies micro variation in the emission
amplitudes of selected stars. The instrument and PI is
from the University of British Coloumbia and the
platform was designed and built by Dynacon Corp and
the University of Toronto (UTIAS). The customer for
MOST is the Canadian Space Agency (CSA). FedSat
was an Australian science/engineering spacecraft with
multiple instruments and PIs from key universities
around Australia. The platform was primarily built by
Space Innovations Limited (SIL), however, that
company ceased to exist before the project was

It is also worth acknowledging that some things in life
are just not fair and some factors influence the markets
of small systems, just as they do large systems. It is
essential to build the cost of these “constraints” into the
business venture in every case. And, it could be that
one or more of these constraints eradicates the
advantage or “apparent” advantage of a small space
system. As a minimum, one needs to be well aware of
any such constraint before entering into business.
2.0 SMALL SPACE SYSTEM TECHNOLOGY
Detractors of and those not well acquainted with small
spacecraft performance may not be aware of the
recently demonstrated performance of a variety of very
small space systems. It is perhaps useful to briefly
establish the state-of-the-art for small space systems.
As a part of the update to this paper, the realities of
Nanosat and Picosat (a.k.a. Cubesat) technology are
dealt with in terms of capability and their market
potential, where applicable.
2.1 Attitude Control Systems (ACS) Performance of
Small Satellites
The ability to accurately direct a sensor in space toward
a desired target, intuitively, may seem to be size
dependent. We all know that large telescopes in space
can direct their boresight to a point in space with subarc second accuracy. Can small objects, even Cubesats
do the same thing? Results are now at hand.
2.1.1 ACS Performance of Microsatellites
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completed. The satellite integration was completed by
Auspace and Vipac Corporations in Australia under the
direction of the Cooperative Research Center for Space
for Space Systems (CRCSS). The customer for the
spacecraft was the Commonwealth Scientific and
Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO). Although
from seemingly different parts of the world, all of these
projects culminated at just about the same time; all
achieved their mission objectives and all exceeded their
mission design lifetimes. Most importantly, all three
mission set new high water marks for attitude control
system (ACS) performance standards for small
satellites (See Table 1).

These seemingly disparate achievements, however, did
have a common denominator. All of them used an ACS
hardware suite and architecture provided by the
Canadian company Dynacon. Dynacon took a large
corporate risk for a small robotics company dabbling in
space for the first time. They set about developing a
low cost RWA (reaction wheel assembly). The unit
used commercial components and traded high reliability
components for a stress screening program using
industrial grade ICs and SMDs. Dynacon received no
shortage of oversight from NASA, CSA and
CRCSS/CSIRO during the development phase of the
wheels but, remained steadfast that such a wheel could
be developed.

Table 1: Demonstrated Performance of ChipSat, MOST and FedSat
Spacecraft Parameter:
Launch Date:
Mass:
Power:
ACS Type and Accuracy:
Pitch:
Roll:
Yaw:
ACS Sensors:

ACS Actuators:
Other ACS Features:
Mission Cost:
Key Mission Obj. Met?

ChipSat
January 12, 2003
64 Kg
40 Watts Orbit Avg.
3-Axis
1.2° (3σ)
1.2° (3σ)
<3.0° (3σ) in sun
3-Axis Flux Gate Mag.
3-Course Sun Sensors
1-Medium Sun Sensor
4-Single Axis Rate Gyros
4 RWAs; 3 Torque Rods
Extended Kalman Filter
$14.5M
YES

MOST
June 30, 2003
60 Kg
45 Watts Orbit Avg.
3-Axis
2.4 arcsec (3σ)
2.4 arcsec (3σ)
4.2 arcsec (3σ)
3-Axis Flux Gate Mag.
1 Sun Sensor
4-Single Axis Rate Gyros
1- Integ. Star Tracker
4 RWAs; 2 Torque Rods
Extended Kalman Filter
$7.5M
YES; +Extended Mission

The results are history.1,2,3 Figures 1 and 2 show
typical one and two axis results for the ACS systems for
ChipSat and MOST respectively. All three satellites,
while operating fundamentally as 3-axis systems (with
suitable de-tumble and safe-hold modes) were used in
quite different ultimate fine resolution modes:

hours) within one year. This was carried out with an
overall observation efficiency of greater than 90%. The
results, shown in Figure 1, indicate what appears to be
an attitude “glitch” which occurs at the time of eclipse
exit from the ChipSat orbit.
While in eclipse the ACS solution depends only on a
magnetometer (which provides two axes of attitude
information) and a course rate sensor (one contained
within each of the wheels). One course sensor
completes the coordinate system. The low cost gyro
drifts with time and temperature and the magnetometer
accuracy is not excellent either. The net effect is that
while the flight computer has done its best to integrate

1) ChipSat performed an all sky survey pointing its
unique UV spectrometer toward a sequence of resels
(each resel being a 5° X 26.5 ° rectangle projected onto
the celestial sphere). If one does the math, there are a
total of 316 such resels on the sky. The mission plan
accomplished was to survey the entire sky in resels
(dwelling on each resel for 50,000 seconds or about 14
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FedSat
December 14, 2002
58 Kg
60 Watts Orbit Avg.
3-Axis
<1.0° (3σ)
<1.0° (3σ)
<1.0° (3σ)
3-Axis Flux Gate Mag.
3 Digital Sun Sensors
3-Single Axis Rate Gyros
1-Exper. Star Tracker
3 RWAs; 3 Torque Rods
Advanced GPS Receiver
$11.2M
YES; + Extended Mission
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respect to a particular S/C principle axis. So, the 3-axis
system for ChipSat (which used 4 wheels) was capable

the inputs of the sensors available, by the end of
eclipse, the satellite has accumulated (in the example of
Figure 1) an error of about 2.1°. Once the sun sensor
re-acquires, the error is corrected by the software loop
and during the sunlit portion of the orbit, the system
maintains the commanded 2.5 degree sun vector angle
with an error of less than 0.5°. The referenced paper
does not state whether the sun angle being referred to is
the RSS sun angle with respect to all axes or is with

of pointing with a 3σ accuracy of something
approaching 1.20° during sunlit portions of the orbit
but, drifted to errors as large as 3 degrees by the end of
spacecraft eclipse periods.

Figure 1: ChipSat Sun Angle During One Target Observation (Janicik & Wolff)4
2) MOST is operated in its fine pointing mode using a
star sensor located inside the primary instrument
telescope at the focal plane. This arrangement then
forms a star tracker. The focal plane array sensor was
included in a closed loop control system. As can be
seen from the results given in Figure 2, the initial ACS
configuration gave an RMS pointing error toward the
“guide star” selected of approximately 13.8 arc-seconds
in pitch and 12.6 arcseconds in yaw (both 3σ). This is
to be compared against a program requirement of 37.5
arc-seconds (3σ). [Technically, the requirement was 25
arc-seconds, 2σ, in P and Y]. Not bad. But, after two
on-board software algorithm improvements the 3σ
accuracy in pitch and yaw was improved to 2.4 arcseconds and 4.2 arc-seconds respectively.
These
improvements were made over the primary mission
lifetime. This performance was also obtained for
protracted observing periods staring at one source star
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and one to several guide stars. Typical star observation
times have been between 14 and 45 days. In order to
achieve this long observation time for target stars, a
twilight sun-synchronous LEO orbit was used by
MOST yielding a Constant Visibility Zone (CVZ).
3) The FedSat ACS system is not described in detail
here but, was similar in terms of modes of operation to
the other two systems. It was operated in a variety of
modes depending upon which experiments were being
performed at any given time. As many of the
experiments were communications experiments or GPS
receiver experiments, the spacecraft would have been
pointed with one facet of the cubical structure to the
NADIR (Earth facing) for protracted times. The system
was different than the other two missions because
FedSat contained a significant magnetometer boom
which would have produced two disturbing torques: 1)
a gravity gradient moment and 2) a solar torque. Thus,
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the ACS system would have had to deal with both of
these system bias conditions simultaneously. It is
known that the ACS system consistently met its 1°
pointing requirement per axis.

been developing an advanced platform for their remote
sensing systems. Eventually, three platforms have
evolved and the performance of these is summarized in
Table 2.

In parallel with these developments, in the United
Kingdom, Surrey Satellite Technology (SSTL) had

Figure 2: Improvements in MOST pointing accuracy and stability as a result of star tracker algorithm
modification. (From Ref. 2).

Platform Type:
Mass:
S/C Power:
Payload Mass:
Downlink Data Rate:
On-Board Data Storage:
ACS Accuracy (P/R/Y)°:

Propulsion ∆V:
Design Lifetime:

Table 2: SSTL Standard LEO Platform Performances
SSTL 100
SSTL 150
100 Kg Avg.
150 Kg. Avg.
100 W Peak/ 50 W Avg. 120 W Peak/60 W Avg.
35 Kg
50 Kg
8 Mbps (S-Band)
40 Mbps (X-Band)
1 GByte S.S.
8 GBytes S.S.; 8 GB H.D.
Not Given
.05/.05/.05 knowledge
Similar to UO-12
0.1/0.1/0.1 control
(See Table 3)
30° Slew Capability
10-15 m/s (Est.)
10-15 m/s (Est.)
5 years
5 years

Detailed information regarding the 3 axis attitude
performance of the SSTL 100, SSTL 150 and SSTL
300 buses is proprietary to SSTL, however, all three
platforms have a technology genesis starting with the
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SSTL 300
300 Kg. Avg.
200W Peak/100W Avg.
70 Kg
105 MBps (X-Band)
128 GBytes Total O.B.S.
.05/.05/.05 knowledge
0.1/0.1/0.1 control
30° Slew Capability
Not Given
7-10 years

UOSAT-12 technology demonstration spacecraft,
launched in 1999 and the ACS performance of that
mission is well reported in the literature. Employed
here is only one reference.5 UOSAT-12 used a
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based its commercial platforms on UOSAT-12
technology (using the appropriate number of SSTL
sensors and actuators for a commercial mission) it is
reasonable to assume that the three platforms offered by
SSTL have ACS performances similar to or better than
the UOSAT-12 results cited here. SSTL began to use
the SSTL 100 platform for the first remote sensing
commercial mission (AlSat-1) in 2002. All three SSTL
platforms will have now flown.

magnetometer, sun sensors, an Earth horizon sensor, a
rate gyro and a GPS receiver for sensing and three
reaction wheels and 12 magnetorquer coils for
spacecraft actuation.
The three reaction wheels
consisted of two developed in-house by SSTL and one,
used for comparison purchased from Ithaco. Table 3,
taken from reference 4, shows the performance of the
UOSAT-12 system in 3-axis zero momentum bias
mode. The results are pitch, roll and yaw attitude error
(mean value and standard deviation). Since SSTL has

Table 3: UOSAT-12 ACS Zero Momentum Bias Performance
Param.
Units
Std-Dev
Mean

Roll
(deg.)
0.13
-0.05

Pitch
(deg.)
0.13
-0.02

Yaw
(deg.)
0.62
0.08

ωx

ωy

ωz

(mdeg/s)

(mdeg/s)

(mdeg/s)

2.0
0.4

1.8
-60.6

5.9
-0.9

We thus have two examples of Microsatellite 3-axis
autonomous attitude control hardware systems
emerging concurrently and now available for
commercial exploitation. They are suitable for multiple
mission types and applications. The emergence of the
two capabilities matured to a point of practical
exploitation within months of one other and both
evolutionary tracks can cite multiple success stories, at
least in terms of technological success. It is therefore,
now easy to conclude:
ACS subsystems for
Microsatellite systems are capable of supporting space
commercialization from a technological perspective.

RWA-Y
(rpm)
5.7
-5.0

RWA-Z
(rpm)
13.4
5.1

prime domain of universities and amateur radio
enthusiasts. The U.S. military and 3 letter agencies
have discovered that these small spacecraft might be
capable of something approaching a significant mission.
And, said agencies have begun to procure these tiny
spacecraft and have made launch capacity on even large
launchers available to Cubesat and Nanosat missions.
Many of these agencies have launched Cubesats
themselves already.
One can only imagine what an agency like NRO will do
with a 3-axis stabilized Cubesat (1U to 3U) with a 5 to
10 arc-sec
pointing capability – which is their
ultimately capability (given star trackers we can now
produce at low cost and tiny size). And, I’ve been told
that the military rapid response crowd has now become
enamored with their potential. Good show. But, if I
were a university aero department chair, I’d be very
concerned about all of this. Historically, whenever big
gets involved (and you would have to agree that the
aforementioned agencies represent big, if anything on
this planet does) the price goes up. And, I think there is
significant evidence that it has - noting the current
going rate for launching a Cubesat, compared to eight
years ago. The message of this paper, even though
focused on commercial space, is – U.S. government:
don’t kill the golden goose! If, even inadvertently, a
market is created, based only on the government’s
ability to pay, then the wonderful opportunity to allow

2.1.2 The ACS Performance of Nanosats and Picosats
(Cubesats)
It has now been eight years since the first Cubesat
conference when educators, students and engineers first
got together to discuss this novel spacecraft concept.
Surprisingly, government involvement in this
technology area has increased in recent times. In fact,
in the past three years a very interesting change has
occurred in this part of the Smallsat arena. Cubesats
have been discovered by “big.” AFRL, ARMY,
DARPA, LANL, NASA, NOAA, NRL, NRO, NSF,
and Boeing (hoping I haven’t missed too many) have
now gotten seriously involved in what had been the
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RWA-X
(rpm)
9.3
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Laboratory (SFL), at the University of Toronto Institute
for Aerospace Studies (UTIAS). The spacecraft has
been a technology pathfinder for a later set of spacecraft
that will demonstrate formation flying. One of the
technologies to be demonstrated was a Sinclair
Planetary reaction wheel as a part of a 3-axis stabilized
Y Thompson-configuration attitude control system.
Over its two year life-time, to date, “a full
demonstration of the attitude determination and control
subsystem including capabilities in accurate payload
pointing (including nadir-tracking), orbit-normal
alignment, and long-duration reaction wheel operation
has been carried out.” CanX-2 is a 3U Cubesat with
dimensions of 10 cm X 10 cm X 34 cm and weighs 3.5
Kg. “Attitude determination and control of the satellite
[is based] on a conceptually simple system. An
accuracy of about ±1.5° is achieved using a set of six
SFL-developed sun sensors, supplemented by an SFLdeveloped, three-axis, magnetometer, which is
deployed approximately 20 cm from the satellite. Orbitnormal alignment, of the satellite’s minor (Y) axis, is
achieved through simultaneous application of wheel
bias and rate-damping control. Pitching, around the
minor axis, is accurate to about 2°. The [one] reaction
wheel (Figure 3), used by CanX-2, was developed in a
partnership between SFL and Sinclair Interplanetary. It
generates a maximum torque of 3 mN·m and has
maximum momentum storage of 30 mN·m·s. Three
hand-wound magnetorquers provide rate damping
control and wheel-momentum management, as
necessary.” Unlike other SFL designs, this spacecraft
does not use rate sensors to augment the spacecraft’s
attitude error during eclipse. In fact, the system has no
attitude requirements defined during eclipse.

young engineers to obtain experience via the
construction of small satellites could be lost. This was
their idea and you will have taken it from them. In
summary, a Cubesat at $350,000 to $500,000 is
ridiculous and is a death sentence to the university and
amateur radio communities. These communities feed
new blood into industry as well as government. So, you
are cutting off the supply of more skilled young
engineers to commercial enterprises as well as
government. Don’t do it and be aware of what you are
doing! I hear you saying that you are funneling money
back into these same institutions to make sure this
doesn’t happen. Well that may work for a few large
universities that can compete in your game but, it
doesn’t help a university that has its own ideas and
wants to buy a secondary launch opportunity for its
students and has to pay your prices for them!
This increased awareness of the technical capabilities at
the very small end of the industry has produced some
reported ACS results but, not as many papers have
appeared providing hard results as would be hoped.
This fact, by itself is somewhat telling. We must
remember, however, that these spacecraft were created
to be “starter” satellites for students with no prior
experience – and this is a wonderful thing. So, the
point is not to be critical here but, simply to state that if
such space systems are going to mature to be useful to
industry, then more information about in-orbit
performance is imperative, given industry’s reliance on
heritage as a selection criterion.

To date three attitude control adjustments (upgrades), in
executable code have been made to the on-board
software. “It is currently estimated that the attitude
determination solution is good to around 1.5 degrees
in sunlight; performance in eclipse is not within the
mission scope. This performance estimate is derived
through comparison of flight telemetry to modeled
performance. The satellite’s imager may be used in the
future for further research into attitude determination
and control performance. It also appears that the EKF
[Extended Kalman Filter] is able to correctly estimate
rates up to about 145 deg/s and control attitude at rates
up to about 90 deg/s, beyond which the solution
aliases.”

The best of the available results are reported here. It is
clear the community is on a threshold where 3-axis
technologies are being flown just about now and results
will soon be available and reported at conferences held
in the very near future. Due to the limited number of
reported results on ACS performance to date, I have
combined the categories of Nanosats and Picosats. In
some cases (such as the 3U Cubesat) the categories
between Nano and Pico are blurred in any case.
1) CanX-2: This spacecraft was launched in April
2008. 6 It was developed by the Space Flight
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Figure 3: Three Sinclair Planetary Wheels – One is Used by SFL on CanX-2.
Since launch a B-dot law rate damper has been used on
several occasions. The on-board propulsion system
tends to spin up the spacecraft during the maneuver. To
recover from high body rates two methods have been
found to reduce the time to damp the spacecraft. One
involves reversing the B-dot control gain and bypassing the EKF temporarily. The second method that
has been effective is to use the wheel to “soak up” the
additional angular momentum and then by applying rate
damping while slowly reducing the wheel speed. Using
these methods the spacecraft has been able to handle
recovery from rates as high as 190 °/sec.

“Payload operations make use of the satellite’s pitch
controller, where the wheel (nominally in
‘momentum mode,’ during orbit-normal alignment)
changes to ‘reaction mode’ in order to slew CanX-2
around its minor axis (ostensibly aligned with the orbit
normal). The torquers are, here, used to trim momentum
in the wheel. To date, payload pointing performance
appears to be good to about 2 degrees.”
2) Norweigan/Canadian Nanosat AISsat: AISsat-1 is
one of the AIS spacecraft we will discuss below. It was
developed by SFL/UTIAS of Canada and is operated by
a Norweigan consortium involving government and
industry. It uses 3 reaction wheels, 6 course/fine sun
sensors, 3 rate sensors and a 3 axis magnetometer.
Touquercoils are used, as per usual, to dump angular
momentum. The spacecraft should be capable of 1.0 to
1.5 degree pointing in all 3 axes , however, hard data
was not available at the time of this paper submission.
A paper on this mission has been accepted at this
conference and will likely publish the ACS results.

The wheel under flight test now has considerably more
than two years of trouble-free performance on the
CanX-2 mission. On-going observations during orbitnormal alignment and various pitch operations reveals
“solid performance with no signs of wheel
degradation.” Although it is difficult to confirm, all
indications are the torque ripple exhibited by the wheel
meets mission requirements of 1.0 mN-m per sec.

3) NRO satellites QbX-1 & 2 and U.S. Army satellite
SMDC-One (Space Missile Defence Command): At
this time data has not been published about these
spacecraft but, I understand they have superior ACS
performance characteristics. I have no idea if the
results of these missions will ever be published in the
open literature. But, given the organizations that paid
for them and built them, I can only say about the
anticipated performance – it had better be good. I’m
counting
on
it
as
a
taxpayer!

One anomaly which occurred within the ACS system
has been fixed via software and this demonstrates the
system’s flexibility.
The wheel, on orbit was
determined to generate a moderate static dipole
magnetic field not detected during ground testing. This
static field was corrected for by applying an opposing
bias vector in order to null out the resulting stray dipole
moment.
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Figure 5: Alignment Angle Between S/C Y-Axis and Orbit Normal

Figure 6: CanX-2 Wheel Pitch Controller: Aligning GPS Antenna to Zenith
In conclusion, what can we say about the current state
of readiness Nanosat and Picosat categories in terms of
ACS system readiness for use? It is probably fair to say
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that we can depend upon these platforms to be ready for
commercial service within one to two years, given the
number of organizations now involved and the level of
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commitment to this class of technology. Thus, the
bottom end of the Smallsat family is becoming a solid
contributor to the viable technology base on which
industry can depend for operational missions. In Nano
and Pico we’re just one step away from hard data and
closing fast.

method that could be used by SmallSat systems but, it is
a possibility. Often a specific analog capability or
digital functionality is required for a mission. The
overall system requirements may impose stringent total
dose requirements on all circuitry as well. There are
multiple ways to achieve high circuit density in order to
meet packaging constraints in all spacecraft. The
preferred methodology these days is to use ASIC
technology and go digital right away. ASICs, of
course, can be made incredibly dense with typical gate
counts as high as millions per die. But, the capital
investment in an ASIC for a spacecraft application is
huge. But, there is another way. One of them is to use
hybrid technology. Hybrids typically integrate multiple
ICs into one monolithic package. While the ICs are
often from the same technology family (e.g., all CMOS)
this need not be so. In fact, sometimes the big guys
integrate well known old rad-hard chips along with
newer technology devices (or maybe with more old
chips) just to be sure that the total integrated hybrid is
radiation hard. So, one could have an LM-124
operation amplifier (designed in about 1974) sitting
beside a state-of-the-art CMOS memory device inside a
hybrid implementing some analog-to-digital transfer
function. This trick assures that the building blocks
used are known “heritage” parts with known radiation
characteristics but, at much higher circuit density than
ever before. It’s not clear whether Microsatellites could
benefit from such an approach but, certainly, in any
case, if the new hybrid part was universal enough to
have its cost amortized over many missions, this could
also be a valid SmallSat technology as well.

2.2 Other Technologies
It is easy enough to lump all other technologies into one
summary category as none quite match the importance
of the progress made in ACS technologies, since the
onset of the SmallSat era. However, some specific
technologies should be highlighted here.
2.2.1 Optical Instruments
Clearly, Earth imaging telescopes have made similar
advances in parallel with ACS technologies as they
have been the rationale and focal point of the ACS
mission demonstrations. UOSAT-12 for instance, not
only flew a massive ACS demonstration package but,
also a Wide Angle Camera with a 2 km resolution, a
High Resolution Camera (panchromatic) with a 10
meter resolution and a Multi-spectral Camera with a 35
meter resolution capability. All of these cameras were
low cost camera systems developed by SSTL and use a
significant number of commercial components. SSTL
is not the only entity to discover cheap optics. In the
first decade of 2000 many initiatives of this kind have
taken place.
2.2.2 Microprocessors and Data Processing
There is a natural tendency for spacecraft engineers to
keep pace with the latest microprocessor technologies
and the real problem in this area is slowing down the
engineers. The serious problem is making really sure
that appropriate commercial processors that are
otherwise suitable for flight are really radiation tolerant.
In general, however, microsatellites and small satellites
are quite far ahead of large spacecraft in terms of
computer performance parameters like MIPS/watt and
Mbytes/cm3. The question is, will such computers
withstand the radiation total dose requirements of a
commercial mission with lifetimes as long as 5 to 15
years and can they also meet the SEE needs for the
mission type?

Notwithstanding clever tricks, the small satellite
community isn’t standing still and is developing its own
heritage. SmallSat vendors can now publish their own
preferred parts lists based on successes and failures in
orbit. Thus, it makes sense to always fly something one
knows works; alongside the next generation device one
want to space qualify, creating an alternative
technology redundancy scheme. This allows a satellite
vendor to always make the jump to the next step
up…unless the advanced device has a massive radiation
failure the last time around and the system had to fall
back to the tried and true device.
All said, in the microprocessor category, the SmallSat
world still has the edge compared to large satellite
systems. In terms of MIPS/watt, where it really counts,

There is an interesting “trick” used by large spacecraft
that requires capital investment, so it is often not a

King

10

25thAnnual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

SmallSats are ahead by a factor of between 100 and
1000. In terms of MIPS/$ SmallSats are ahead by a
factor of between 10 and 100 (at the system level) and
this fact can be taken to the bank!
2.2.3 Power Subsystems,
Efficiency, RF Power

Power

constellation (100s to 1000s) of very small spacecraft,
operating synergistically, to achieve system capacities
as high as (or higher than) modern FSS, MSS or BSS
GEO systems but, it is a stretch and it sounds very
expensive as a business proposition. The laws of
satellite scaling work against this approach. Satellite
replenishment of constellations (even of big satellites)
has been very problematic, to date, economically
speaking. And, with such system concepts there
remains a problem all system engineers are becoming
acutely aware of. The spacecraft of such a system
would necessarily be mass production items, which
generates a classical concern: What do you do with the
garbage? Note that every piece of this debris as it orbits
the Earth, especially at lower altitudes, is travelling at
speed of about 8 km/sec relative to the Earth. This
problem will only become more acute with time and it
is one more mess we humans must deal with – with
priority.

Generation

In the late 1990s all advanced programs were flying
GaAs solar cells with an efficiency of 18% and talking
a lot about mulit-junction cells. In 2011, multi-junction
solar cells are routinely flown and provide >28%
efficient power to satellites. Engineers now are testing
34% efficient cells. But, these improvements are
available and are exploited by both large and small
satellites. So, there is no differentiator here except for
the fact that this 56% increase in power over 10 years,
arguably increases the performance of a small satellite
by a larger factor than it does a large satellite. This
level of power, in an absolute sense, may also enable
certain small satellite mission types that were not
possible before. So, that is a good thing. Clearly
CubeSats become viable and NanoSats become far
more capable because of high efficiency multi-junction
solar cells.

In summary, while advances in power generation and
efficiency are beneficial to small satellites, the case has
not been made, technologically, for small satellites
(meaning spacecraft less than 100 Kg) to assume the
role of large satellites in the telecommunications arena.
The physics just isn’t there if maximized data rate and
price/bit are program goals.

The generation of RF power from DC power has
continued to improve in efficiency over time. Newer
technologies such as GaAs and InP heterojunction
bipolar transistors (HBTs) promise to greatly improve
the efficiency of RF generation at microwave
frequencies, however, the absolute power levels that
can be generated by this technology are not yet high
enough. In the literature multiple discussions still
suggest that devices with outputs as high as 10 Watts at
microwave frequencies are viable and at high efficiency
but, these parts do not yet exist. At the same time
HBTs have now been qualified for space use so, they
have leaped that hurdle, in terms of radiation hardness.

2.2.4 Structures, Mechanisms and Thermal Design
Changes
If a spacecraft can generate 56% more power than it
could ten years ago and if that spacecraft design doesn’t
radiate that power away as RF energy at some radio
frequency or other, then the system must dissipate that
power back to space as heat in the form of black body
radiation as dictated by the radiance equation. Thus,
new small spacecraft that wish to take advantage of
high efficiency solar arrays may face new thermal
dissipation challenges. Thermal radiating technologies
have not changed much in 40 years (give or take a few
improvements in the deterioration rate of white paint)
so, the dissipation problem amounts to increasing the
available satellite surface area in order to radiate the
heat away at an acceptable temperature. In this way,
small satellites have a big problem. However, there is
another change in small satellite thinking that helps
with this problem. Small satellites are beginning to

Even taking these two power design factors (DC and
RF power generation efficiency) into account small
satellite still have a difficult time entering classical
large satellite telecommunications markets simply
because the effective isotropic radiated power (EIRP)
demanded by high capacity commercial services cannot
easily be generated by one or even many small satellites
operating over any area of the Earth. The phrase
“cannot easily” obviously covers a host of sins. Some
could argue, it may be possible for a very large
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become less timid about using deployment mechanisms.
Thus, deploying a panel from a small satellite for the
sole purpose of providing more thermal radiation area,
while once unthinkable, is probably not anymore. And,
if it were done for a commercial program so that the
deployment and the heat transfer technology could be
thoroughly tested (as money would be available) then
taking full advantage
age of the power generation
improvements possible for small satellites might still be
possible, and in a commercial sense. After all, this is
exactly what the “big guys” do. Such a technological
approach as is used now by the largest GEOs may
“scale” very well to SmallSats.

difference in mind set between big and small.
Referring to “big space” as the “traditional approach”
one of the graphics was as show in Figure 7.

3.0 SATELLITE DEVELOPMENT METHODS,
PROCEDURES AND PROCESSES
If you asked a large satellite system engineer (someone
from Boeing, Lockheed-Martin
Martin or Astrium) to design
and build a small satellite system meeting a certain set
of requirements,
ents, including a reasonable mission
lifetime, would they do it entirely in the same way as
we would do it in the small satellite industry? Of
course, the answer is no. And, many of us who have
been in this “culture” for awhile would smile as we said
no because, within the total answer to this question lies
the true understanding of how money can be saved in
small space systems and why commercial ventures are
worth considering at the small end of the scale. It is
also why eventually, in certain markets, large satellites
will simply cease to exist.

Figure 7:: “BigSat” Thinking
In fact, I’m sure Martin would agree, this is not a planar
figure. It eventually becomes an upward spiral (out of
the plane of the paper) of increasing cost and reduced
risk along with other factors like increased insurance
premiums
ums and longer schedules. But, there is an
alternative way of thinking and it drives all that is done
on small satellite programs and it fully changes the
management, development mechanisms, procurement
strategy and testing philosophy of a satellite progr
program.
We contrast the BigSat approach with that of Figure 8.
Although a proof for this is not offered in this paper, the
relationship between established reliability and mission
cost is highly non-linear.
linear. Every small increase in
established reliability is extraordinarily expensive, and
we will see later some of the reasons why this is
necessarily so.

You can look at the above question another way: How
much would that SmallSat cost if it were built using
large satellite rules (e.g., if it were built by Lockheed
Martin…just to pick a large satellite company name)?
n
Let’s look at where the real differences are hidden.

Today, there are a handful of companies in the SmallSat
community that are existence proofs that SmallSat
thinking does pay off in terms of the cost and schedule
sch
of delivered spacecraft. Far more importantly, as can
be observed by anyone on the Internet in a matter of
moments, systems that use spacecraft built to this
philosophy now exist; these satellites are in business
and operate at a fraction of the costt of their counterparts
using larger satellite systems and they are making
money.. We need no longer speculate or debate as to
whether the philosophy of Figure 8 is valid.

3.1 Total System Approach and Mentality
Big vs. small really starts with a mind set and one
works forward from there. Professor Sir Martin
Sweeting, speaking on the very same topic upon which
this
is paper focuses, was addressing a NASDA (now
JAXA) Symposium in Tokyo.7 This was in September
of 2003. [NOTE: I’m borrowing Martin’s ideas here
because he always barrows my ideas too and that’s
because we both have the same message and we are
always trying
ing to deliver it to those who would listen].
In that presentation Martin showed two slides
lides about the
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of a review where everyone on a system or subsystem is
side-tracked
tracked to generate the data pack for that review,
and observing that this takes away from other essential
on-going engineering activities, itt is surprising that
more adjustments to the review process are not made by
large satellite companies in order to reduce their costs.
The counter argument is that such a “review system”
once perfected provides an air tight system for catching
design, test and fabrication errors when they occur (and
they will). The SmallSat counter to the counter is, “is
such a system really air tight?” And, the answer is no.
Some time ago, I encountered yet another example of
human imperfection. In a review I attended, a design
error was caught in the design review of a mechanical
structure. A dimension was incorrect. The correction
was straight-forward.
forward. The error was dutifully recorded
in the DR minutes. But, there was inadequate followfollow
up. The error was not properly
rly changed in the drawing
system and the error remained in the high level and
lower level documentation system; the CAD drawings
went to manufacturing and a bad part was fabricated,
delivered, quality checked (to the bad drawing) and
integrated onto the satellite.
atellite. Only at the time of a major
mating event (payload to platform) was the error
discovered. The lesson here is that the review process
is no better than the people who are implementing it
and people, by their nature, are not perfect. (This is a
known
nown fact, actually.) As the number of reviews
increases toward an uncountable number, the DR
tracking paperwork increases by a factor larger than
that and the probability of errors creeping into the DR
process itself reaches certainty in the limit. The
conclusion here is that large programs are operating
well beyond a practical limit where the cost of
reviewing is justified by the number of problems found
and actually corrected during the entire process. They
are beyond the point of diminishing returns.

Figure 8: “SmallSat” Thinking
Sadly, however, just because we can fabricate a
particular
articular spacecraft cost effectively does not mean that
the application to which it is put will make money.
Engineers must keep reminding themselves that there is
more to a business than just bits of hardware and
software. It is also necessary to be clever
cle
enough to
pick applications that can make money. We will
examine these realities shortly.
less, sticking to the SmallSat philosophy for
None-the-less,
the moment, how does this philosophy manifest itself in
terms of methods and processes at the design,
development and manufacturing levels?
3.2 The Design Review Process
No one would ever argue that the design review is not a
useful tool or that they are not necessary. They are
essential to all space programs (and to many other
industries other than our own – we aren’t really as
unique as we think we are sometimes). They are
essential if for no other reason than to be sure the
program office has itself fully organized – at least at the
time each review is held. The question that arises is
what is an adequatee review schedule or sequence?
Table 4 shows the design review matrix that might be
used by a typical large space system program. The
generalized example here is taken more from what
would be the expectation in the European world. In
Europe there is a tendency
endency to have a full set of reviews
for every single component (i.e. box) not previously
qualified, for every single subsystem and, of course, a
detailed review at the system level. In North America
there are frequently fewer types of reviews and fewer
reviews at the component level. Considering the cost
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Table 5 is the SmallSat response to the design review
process. Major reviews of subsystems and the system
are still present. But, component level reviews are
largely suppressed.
Components/units of a very
complex nature or utilizing very new technologies,
technolo
of
course, would be the focal point of review activities.
Reviews such as Test Readiness Reviews and Test
Review Boards do not typically exist at the component
level because many environmental tests are not
performed at the unit level in SmallSat pr
programs (this
will be addressed further in the discussion on test

13

25thAnnual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

planning). A vast savings in design review labor takes
place in the SmallSat case because of the reduction in

review count at the component level multiplied by the
number of components making up the system.

Table 4: Large Spacecraft Program Design Review Matrix
DESIGN REVIEWS (In Order):
UNITS:
Major Structural Components
Battery
Battery Charge Regulator
Power Distribution Electronics
Solar Array Peak Tracking Unit
Solar Array Structure
Solar Array Drive Unit
Solar Array Rotary Joint
Propulsion Tank(s)
Fill and Drain Valve(s)
Pyro Valve(s)
Thrusters
Kick Motor
Pyro Initiation Unit(s)
Command Detect and Decode
Command Decryption
Telemetry Conditioner/Encoder
Telemetry Multiplexer
Telemetry Transmitter
Command Receiver
Antennas
Major RF Filters
GPS Receiver
Flight Computer
Flight Software
ACS
C&DH
Power
Fault Tolerance
Other Major
Payload/Instrument
All Payload Units

DRR

EQSR

PDR

CDR

MRR

TRR

TRB

QR

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X

X

X

SUBSYSTEMS:
Structure
Spacecraft Separation
Harness
RF Harness
Thermal
Power
Propulsion
Command & Data Handling
Telecommunications
Flight Computation
Flight Software
Payload Power
Payload Computer(s)
Payload Software
EGSE
MGSE

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

SYSTEM:
Payload/Instrument
Assembly Integration & Test
Spacecraft

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

FRR

LRR

MORR

SIOTRR

IOTRB

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

engineers are encouraged to overlook the designs of
their fellow engineers with an eye toward catching
mistakes. This sort of behavior, in fact, is discouraged
or prohibited (as a form of intellectual property
protection, if nothing else) in large satellite companies.
The ability for peer review to be effective depends upon
the ability of say, a thermal engineer to overlook the
design of a mechanical engineer as they both have the
same background in finite element modeling.

But, there is one more key difference between reviews
held by big and small companies. In large satellite
systems the process known as peer reviewing is
occasionally used. A peer review is almost always
considered to be an informal process and is used as a
tool at the discretion of technical mangers. In small
satellite systems discipline overlap is necessarily greater
than in programs with a very large staff size. For
SmallSat projects, the peer review is a fundamental
process. Discipline overlap is key. Small satellite
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Table 5: SmallSat Program Design Review Matrix
DESIGN REVIEWS (In Order):
UNITS:
Major Structural Components
Battery
Battery Charge Regulator
Power Distribution Electronics
Solar Array
Propulsion Tank(s)
Fill and Drain Valve(s)
Pyro Valve(s)
Thrusters
Kick Motor
Pyro Initiation Unit(s)
Command Detect and Decode
Telemetry Conditioner/Encoder
Telemetry Multiplexer
Telemetry Transmitter
Command Receiver
Antennas
Major RF Filters
GPS Receiver
Flight Computer
Flight Software
ACS
C&DH
Power
Fault Tolerance
Other Major
Payload/Instrument
All Payload Units
SUBSYSTEMS:
Structure
Spacecraft Separation
Harness
RF Harness
Thermal
Power
Propulsion
Command & Data Handling
Telecommunications
Flight Computation
Flight Software
Payload
EGSE
MGSE
SYSTEM:
Payload/Instrument
Assembly Integration & Test
Spacecraft

DRR

SCR

PDR

CDR

X

X

X
X

X
X

X

MRR

TRR

TRB

X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X

X

X
x

X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
x
x

X
x
x

X

X

X

X

PSR

FRR

X

X

LRR

MORR

X

N

X

X

N

X
X
X
X
X
X
x=mini review; X=major review; N = New = Review Not Typically Used by Large Spacecraft Progam

In large satellite companies a “peer” is another “like
kind” of engineer who is typically barrowed from
another program for a short period of time in order to
review a colleague’s work. But, the barrowed engineer
may not be familiar with the tradeoffs made in that
program or may not be as familiar with the system
design of that particular spacecraft as another member
of the same satellite team. In some SmallSat programs
peer review has become so important that it has become
a formal process. In fact, technical peer reviews of
subsystems are formally interspersed among the more
“standard” reviews held. Customers are invited to such
reviews.
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3.3 Development Mechanisms
Arguably, this topic is a broad area to cover in the
process of satellite creation. And, it is hard to cover
properly in a survey paper of this nature. Since the
effort here is to focus on the distinctions between large
and small space systems, let’s choose to point out only
the largest differences. All manufacturing companies
(not just aerospace) clearly have customers because
they manufacture something that is needed and works.
Product assurance is, of course, tied directly to the
procedures and processes used to make things. Large,
experienced satellite makers have mature procedures
and processes. Small satellite manufacturers are
younger companies making things a new way. Quite
reasonably, their procedures and processes are going to
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be less mature as a consequence. One could certainly
agree that it is likely that Boeing could make a better
widget than AAA SatellitesRUs, Inc., who has only
been in business for 10 years. The first question is:
But, at what price? And the second question is: So,
how long will both products work in space? Let’s focus
on these two questions.

piece part can be traced to the raw materials from
whence it came. Detractors would quickly point out
that the same argument applies here as it did with the
“over-reviewed” design review process. The human
elements of the parts tracking process are not perfect
and so, one must question at what point the errors in
tracking and recording bad parts may allow as many
bad parts to get through the system as might have
gotten through using an alternative system - which
didn’t have all of the cost.

3.3.1 Piece Parts
The specific use of piece parts in space systems is the
absolute front line battle ground between big and small.
There is no larger difference in approach or difference
of opinion than on this topic. And, the cost differential
associated with the two variant implementation
approaches explains one of the largest cost disparities
between large and small satellite systems. It is sheer
stubbornness on the part of large satellite companies not
to embrace a more liberal parts selection process, which
results in the single largest advantage to SmallSat
systems over big ones – and it makes possible a huge
incremental performance improvement for small
satellite systems, without R&D investment on their part.

An alternative system certainly exists and is in effect,
for one example, in the automotive industry.
Automotive manufacturers, unable to afford the
expense of a military piece parts tracking system, have
worked with electronics (most notably semiconductor)
manufactures to establish positive feedback assembly
lines that randomly sample components from the output
of a line of devices. The samples are functionally
measured and statistically evaluated and, based on the
results, automated process adjustments are made to the
line in order to optimize (i.e., improve) performance
and reliability. The finished parts are electrostatically
protected and are usually vacuum packaged and shipped
to the automotive assembly line, often in a “just in
time” fashion, untouched by human hands. An example
of this process is the “Six Sigma” parts program of
Motorola. Such parts are established to be sufficiently
reliable to put into applications such as the breaking
system of a Chrysler automobile, operating under all
environmental conditions seen by a car during its
design lifetime. Hopefully, there is no one reading this
paper who thinks that the environment seen by an
automobile during its entire lifetime is less harsh than
that seen by a spacecraft during its lifetime, so I won’t
venture further on this point. While Chrysler and other
clients of Motorola (by way of example) may have paid
for the development of Six Sigma feedback technology,
that certainly doesn’t mean that Motorola was
fundamentally prevented from applying this kind of
reliability-enhancing technology to nearly their entire
line of parts. It also does not prevent Motorola’s
competitors from offering similar technology
enhancements which improve component reliability.
And, absolutely nothing prevents the SmallSat
community from taking advantage of any of these stateof-the art parts, produced originally for automotive
applications (but, later on for many other applications)
and applying those parts to space system designs. A

The term “piece parts” is the traditional aerospace
name given to the smallest component elements used in
spacecraft. They are passive and active electronic and
mechanical components (resistors, capacitors, ICs,
transistors, screws, nuts, rivets, etc.) used in every
aspect of spacecraft fabrication. For our purposes now,
we will ignore mechanical piece parts, although we
could also have an interesting discussion about them as
well. Rather, because of their larger impact, let’s focus
on electronic components this time.
The aerospace industry, as a whole, has focused on a
military approach to electronic piece part procurement.
Under this process specific standards for quality and
performance have been established and specific piece
parts are built and screened to those standards and the
parts thus produced are only used for military and space
programs. No one else could or would afford to.
Furthermore, large aerospace companies establish
preferred parts lists which provide a framework for the
selection of components based on past experiences with
parts from within the entire range of parts that might be
used, based on the military parts standards. A paper
system has been put in place to track individually serial
numbered parts along with their manufacturing date
code and manufacturing location. In most instances a

King

16

25thAnnual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

smug SmallSat designer or project manager might be
heard in the corridors at a conference saying, “If it’s
good enough for BMW then it’s good enough for me”
and, he or she would have some considerable basis in
fact for such a statement. And, here is the significant
advantage to SmallSat’s…the big guys are missing out
on the state-of-the-art piece parts because they will not
consider using them until they have been through the
military screening process; a process that takes many
years to complete, if at all. And, by definition, after the
elapse of that much time, they will no longer be stateof-the-art piece parts. Moore’s law is real.

Corporation) [German chapter] realized that the
standard and the chips available were ideal devices for
command and telemetry networking between a central
flight computer and on-board remote controllers.
AMSAT developed a very small CANbus remote
terminal board concept that was used in its then current
satellite project in order to implement a distributed
command/control/telemetry capability. 9
SSTL,
having worked closely with AMSAT over many years,
then picked up the standard for use with many of their
distributed control applications in SmallSats.
Subsequently, many small satellites designed by many
companies have used CANbus controllers with their
own implementations. [NOTE the advantage in this
example of an open system interface.] CAN is simple,
reliable, capable, fast enough--- and vastly cheaper than
1553 protocol satellite bus systems.
CAN is
responsible for distributed processing even on very
small, very low cost satellite systems. If small space
systems would have had to depend upon military data
protocols in order to implement distributed processing,
this paper would certainly be irrelevant today.

An example of using a specific automotive piece part
may drive home the point. Many years ago the U.S.
military was developing fighter aircraft like the F-18.
Advanced fighters would not be stable in flight without
servo feedback technology and thus fly-by-wire
concepts emerged. From that set of requirements,
eventually, a command and control data bus emerged
which was given a military standard number: MILSTD-1553. In its day it was state-of-the-art and met the
requirements of the aircraft fly-by-wire community,
despite some fairly hefty software overhead associated
with the exchange protocols between the central
processor and remote units sending and receiving data.
Today this standard has been selected for use on many
large space systems world-wide.
The hardware,
however, remains large and the software overhead for
using MIL-STD-1553 is more significant than it needs
to be. Meanwhile, in the 1980’s the automotive
company Robert Bosch, GmBH developed a data bus
intended for in-vehicle networking. It was called CAN
(Controller Area Network) 8. Simply put, CAN allows
multiple devices to be linked together on the same bus.
As many of the functions envisioned were safety related
(so far as automobiles were concerned) the standard
incorporated two sub-buses; one for high priority needs
(CAN-Hi) and one for lower level functions (CAN-Lo).
The standard was quickly adopted and initially was
certified as EOBD-ISO-15031, a European standard.
The first chips available to support this standard were
developed by Intel and Phillips. It is now used as the
primary in-vehicle network standard by Ford, General
Motors and Mercedez, to name but a few. So far, two
billion cars contain hardware/firmware using the
CANbus standard and devices. Does this sound like it
might be useful for spacecraft systems? The non-profit
organization AMSAT (The Radio Amateur Satellite
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But, the issue does not stop here. Certainly not all piece
parts needed are of the “six sigma” variety. And not all
six sigma parts are necessarily radiation tolerant,
although they may be highly reliable, otherwise. In
order to improve further the reliability of piece parts
taken from industrial applications instead of preferred
parts lists, some small satellite companies have
subjected their piece parts to a process known as stress
screening. Energies available here do not permit an
exhaustive description of stress screening. This process,
however, involves accepting parts directly from
suppliers without specific pre-screening or serialization
and then subjecting 100% of the parts to be flown to
very rapid thermal cycling over a temperature range
that “carefully and thoughtfully” exceeds the
manufacturer’s data sheet for each device. During the
thermal stress process (which translates to a mechanical
stress when evaluated from a TCE perspective) some
parts (particularly capacitors) also have an impressed
terminal voltage applied. This voltage also exceeds the
manufacturers’ recommended maximum values by a
carefully selected amount. The parts are then selected
and rank-sorted, based on performance after test and are
subsequently installed on flight PCBs without further
test or evaluation. In this process, the parts necessarily
become temporarily serialized but, this is only for the

17

25thAnnual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

purpose of performance scoring and ranking prior to
installation on PCBs. This process has been found by
many organizations to be a faster and cheaper way to
obtain high reliability parts without going through the
military parts selection process.

strategy, of course, starts the company down the
slippery slope toward technological obsolescence,
which, by-the-way, goes hand-in-hand with “flight
heritage.” Balance here is important and prudent.
7) Accept reasonable reductions in overall system
reliability as a part of the cost savings equation
presented above for big vs. small systems. (See Figure
4 above). Remember, within the SmallSat philosophy
there is the concept of “reliability commensurate with
cost.”

Radiation evaluation and testing remains the single
“tough nut” issue and the potential stumbling block for
SmallSat systems. No amount of clever parts selection
can guarantee that each piece part will not be subjected
to a potentially lethal cumulative radiation dose; at least
over some period of time in orbit. The same could be
true for single event effects (SEE) if not dealt with
directly. In order for SmallSats to stay ahead of large
systems and use state-of-the-art piece parts there are
only a few options available to designers:

The piece parts issue does not end here either but,
carries on further into the test regime and that will be
discussed separately.
3.3.2 Worst Case Analysis

1) Use the same Single Event Effect analytical tools to
evaluate the candidate parts as would be used by all
spacecraft designers, big and small. This increases the
SmallSat company’s development (NRE) costs.

If this paper is objective then I must report, this is one
topic that runs afoul for SmallSat in the comparison
between big and small. Large spacecraft companies
produce many documents as a part of their analytical
evaluation within the design process. Most of these
documents are of questionable value to small satellite
systems with their far fewer parts and lower system
complexity. But one of these documents looms above
the others in its importance to all satellite designers: it
is called the Worst Case Analysis (WCA). I have
seldom if ever seen a SmallSat company perform a
proper WCA on a unit, subsystem or system. The
WCA is simple in principle but, difficult in its detail. In
the case of a circuit design, the WCA looks at the
circuit performance (eventually using high performance
software tools like SPICE, where applicable) under the
following conditions:

2) Perform sensible and prudently designed radiation
testing using Co-60 sources that may be available but,
might be intended for other applications (e.g.,
contracting with metallic weld survey facilities and
specialized medical x-ray facilities may offer low cost
solutions when compared with typical aerospace source
options). [NOTE: The National Laboratory costs for
testing military screened parts are never cheap.]
3) Use alternate technology redundancy as a mitigation
to potential newly designed hardware so that there is a
fail soft option on every spacecraft. This process
should be a standard strategy for any company in the
commercial SmallSat business.

1) End of life degradation, including cumulative dose
radiation effects

4) Take advantage of all space flight opportunities to
flight test very important technologies that may have a
long term strategic value to the intended SmallSat
enterprise. Cubesats could greatly assist here and
money might be made in the bargain.

2) Worst case high and low power supply voltage
conditions
3) Worst case high and low temperature environments

5) Use every prudent SEE design trick-in-the-book in
order to avoid single event effects (e.g. EDAC memory
augmentation and very frequent data re-writes of all
potentially susceptible memory buffer areas).

4) Degradation due to any specialized effect that can be
defined (e.g. materials degradation effects)
And the WCA insists on applying all of these factors, in
a worst case manner…at the same time. That is, they
are all turned ON at the same time during the analysis.
For a formal space program of a large satellite, the

6) Adopt a SmallSat preferred parts list, which is based
on the company’s current in-flight experience. This
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requirement is that the unit under WCA conditions must
still function…and with certain established margins.

in space for more than 30 years and many have fulfilled
mission objectives for well beyond their design
lifetime, as has been demonstrated by ChipSat, MOST,
FedSat, UOSAT-12 and DMC (all mentioned above).

WCAs are time consuming because it takes real time
and effort, within each satellite program, to obtain all of
the information implied by the conditions given in 1) to
4) above. Consequently, this analysis can usually not
be completed much before the time of the Critical
Design Review (CDR). While such an analysis is not a
trivial exercise, it is potentially very valuable. It would
be valuable to SmallSats as well as big ones. Such an
analysis is reasonably costly but, it should result in
satellites working longer and… in a commercial
environment…that is everything.
To the service
provider it is a better return on investment (increased
ROR) and longer lifetime will also improve net present
values (NPVs). It is a recommendation of this paper
that SmallSat companies should adopt this analytical
tool and service providers should insist on it in their
CDRL lists and end item data packages (EIDPs). The
WCA, of course, poses an extreme scenario to the unit
under evaluation. It may not be realistic but, if the
system, subsystem or unit withstand such conditions,
then system managers and clients alike can be relatively
confident that lifetime requirements will be met – IF the
analyses are VALID. And, that is what design reviews
should be for.

3.4 Assembly, Integration and Test (AIT)
Assembly and Integration: The process of Assembly
and Integration of space systems vary less between
satellite classes than uninvolved individuals might
think. Historically, excess capacity in clean room
facilities has been available to all interested small
satellite firms or organizations, simply because of the
large excess capacity within the aerospace or related
industries (e.g. semiconductor industry). Further, it is
not difficult to construct a suitable clean room
capability at low cost, thus anyone who has really
needed to integrate small satellite systems under similar
conditions to those of large satellite companies has been
able to do so. Put simply, obtaining a Class 100,000
clean area for satellite integration is no big deal…and it
never has been (i.e., HEPA filters are not scary). It is
unlikely to be a problem into the future and is low on
the list of issues or differences between big and small.
The number of MGSE and EGSE tools required to
integrate a large spacecraft vs. a small one is a
somewhat larger issue. Still, we might say that MGSE
and EGSE costs are more or less proportional to
satellite size and leave it at that. In fact, in this paper
we are trying to identify issues where there is a nonlinear relationship between big and little, not linear
differences.

There are, of course, WCAs for mechanical components
and subsystems as well as electrical ones. The
difference is that mechanical tolerances and Eigen
frequencies are substituted for voltages and currents and
radiation effects may be considered nil. However, once
again, the conclusion is the same: WCA are an
important tool for ALL spacecraft engineers and system
engineers.

One thing has always been clear to companies and
individuals that were serious about small satellite
systems for commercial use. A space system, used
commercially, must perform its intended function
reliably and for a prescribed period of time (or longer).
In order to make small satellites really reliable and to
convince others (customers, investors, primary payload
operators [if the small satellite is flying piggyback], and
even component vendors) extensive functional and
environmental testing is the only answer. The tests
must also be well documented.

In our evaluation then, SmallSat companies today do
not measure up on the issue of WCA but, it’s an area
where improvement can be relatively easily made. If
one wants to have a major impact on the question, “So,
how long will it work in space?” then the WCA is a
very useful tool in answering the question before the
satellite is launched. The final word - the answer to the
system lifetime question isn’t just given by the WCA,
however. In orbit results are the final answer. And the
history of SmallSats, fortunately, proves that there is no
reduction in the lifetime of a satellite system, simply
because of its size. Some small satellites have survived
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Testing: We jump back immediately to the piece parts
issue, since the first test we can perform to convince
others that the parts will work is a demonstration test.
Normally, in large satellite programs “burn-in”
(meaning functionally testing a component) lasts for
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150 to 300 hours. Despite the name, burn-in is a room
temperature test using EGSE providing flight-like
stimuli. In order to be convincing, small satellite
programs have often offered to test their units for up to
1000 hours of burn-in. SpaceDev offered this test
method to NASA for flight components used on the
ChipSat program. NASA/GSFC accepted this approach
and integrated this test into their program test plan.
This is a simple thing to do and an easy offering to
make to a client. Other things can be done on the
project while each individual unit is accumulating these
hours. It’s not really that expensive to accomplish.
This simple type of added testing provides a higher
confidence in the piece parts and at the same time gives

Thermal Cycle
(24 Cycles)

Functional
Test

additional insight into the functional behavior of the
component.
A second method of providing added confidence is to
environmentally test all hardware at protoflight levels
(qualification levels for acceptance duration) regardless
of the components development status or heritage. This
becomes an essential point (a necessary point) when
one considers the next issue.
If piece parts are the major battle ground issue between
big and small then the subject of component level
environmental testing is at least a major skirmish issue.
Figure 9 shows the test flow for a typical component in
a
big
program

Vibration/Shock

FT

FT

Thermal
Vacuum

(Sine, Random,
Shock)

QUALIFICATION UNIT (Qual. Levels for Qual. Duration)

FT
EMI/EMC

Functional
Test

150-300 Hr

Thermal Cycle

Burn-In

(12 Cycles)

FT

Vibration

(Full Mil-Std 461)

(Sine & Random)

FLIGHT UNIT (Acceptance Levels for Acceptance Duration)
EMI/EMC
(Full Mil-Std 461)

System Level EMI/EMC
(Selective Tests)

Integrate
Component
into S/C

System FT

End of Unit Life
System FT

System Level Vibration
System Level
Thermal Vacuum

(Random or Acoustic)

System Comprehensive
Performance Test

S/C Complete

Figure 9: Large Spacecraft Component Test Sequence
Now we compare this to a typical SmallSat test
sequence shown in Figure 10. We first notice that
there is no real qualification for the small satellite
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component in that a unit is not tested to near its
breaking point (i.e., until it is no longer considered
flight-worthy and therefore it is retired). Rather a
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proto-flight approach is taken and a single flight unit
undergoes some testing at the unit level but, goes all the
way to flight. The contentious issue in this sequence
for large satellite system engineers is that Smallsat
companies usually do not subject the component to
vibration or thermal vacuum at the unit level; only at
the system level. The classical argument for not doing
it this way is that having a component failure for the
first time at the system level is far too risky. One
should learn about the failure mechanisms of
components soon after they are built. To wait until
system level testing could be a disaster. But, that’s big
satellite thinking. One gets to system level testing
much faster with the small satellite approach because
one doesn’t have to wait through the very long test
program where units are, one after the other, put
through vibration and thermal vacuum test sequences.
So, one reaches TVAC at just about the same time as

you would have with a big satellite approach, maybe
even sooner. Once the components are integrated and
functionally tested, the environmental levels established
are proto-flight, not acceptance level. [NOTE: This is
true regardless of the number of flight units built in the
contract.] So, the system level test seen by the
component prior to launch is more severe than the one
seen by the large flight satellite system, on a per unit
basis. The big satellite components, however, have
seen two tests, which the small satellite community
would say is unnecessary, wasteful and expensive. Just
as important an argument in favor of this approach is
the term “heritage” may now be applied to small
satellite system testing. This process has been done this
way for so long now and it has been so successful, that
success is the strongest argument for continuing this
methodology. Small can now play the same game as
big.

PROTOFLIGHT UNIT (Qualification Levels for Acceptance Duration)
Functional
Test

1000 Hour
Burn-In

Thermal Cycle
(24 Cycles)

Integrate
Component
into S/C

System
Functional
Test

System Level
Thermal Vacuum

System Level
EMI/EMC
(Selective Tests)

System FT

System Level
Comprehensive
Performance Test

FT

EMI/EMC
(RE-02 Only)

System Level Vibration
(Sine, Random, Shock)

S/C Complete

Self Compatibility

Figure 10: Small Spacecraft Component Test Sequence
Please note that I have ignored mass properties
determination as a “test” here because it is a noncontentious activity and is not really relevant to the
discussion. It would be accomplished in both cases.

encapsulation device as a part of the separation system
of a spacecraft from its host launch vehicle. A P-pod
protects the launch vehicle or the primary satellite from
a NanoSat or CubeSat which may become disassembled
or which could otherwise cause damage during the
dynamics of launch. For some spacecraft using this sort
of separation system the launch authority has required

We can take this one step further now. The SmallSat
community has introduced the concept of a P-pod, or
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procedures and processes, then the unit is considered to
have heritage with respect to the program holding the
EQSR.
Verification of qualification is indeed a
worthwhile process. It is one of the steps toward
improving overall system level reliability. But, the flip
side to the heritage issue is “obsolescence.” Are there
competitive issues involved in continuously using
heritage units? Competiveness factors are faced not
only by the satellite vendor (where the engineers
involved are well aware of advancing technology) but
by the satellite customer as well. And, the customer
may be far less aware when he attends an EQSR, that
he has just accepted (by his approval) a unit that limits
the competitiveness of his spacecraft, either
immediately or some years down the road.

them to environmentally test their spacecraft only to
acceptance levels. The logic is clear, additional
mechanical margin is not required to be demonstrated
by test (only by analysis) and the P-pod acts as the
safety valve in the event of a failure. Not all launch
vehicle authorities have grated this reduced testing
option, however, it is another example of how small is
making advances and progressing in a direction that big
can never go. If such a scheme can be adopted then
Figure 10 is the same, except that Proto-Flight is
replaced by Acceptance testing.
So what has happened here? We have reduced the
schedule, cost and risk of over-testing every component
in the spacecraft by modifying our test methodology. If
the small satellite methods given here were applied to a
large spacecraft it would indeed save a lot of money.
As the system complexity of a small satellite is
considerably less than a large one, then the savings for
small systems themselves, by using these techniques, is
only of a moderate value but, still quite significant. It is
the comparison between small and big which is the
important dynamic. What has been lost by adopting
this approach? Only the possibility of not detecting a
failure mechanism by test earlier than it would
otherwise be found. In any case, if a TVAC or
vibration test would catch a failure in the test sequence
in Figure 7 then, it would also be caught in the test
sequence of Figure 8.

One would be much happier IF, at these EQSRs one
more question were asked: “Is it likely that this
component, if used in this current spacecraft system,
will render it significantly less capable and competitive
than a spacecraft I might buy from a competitor who is
cautiously pressing forward toward the state-of-the-art
in this area of technology?” Put differently, what
performance is being lost (now or immediately into the
future) by picking this oldie but, goodie?
Competitiveness is important to all of us and so is
reliability. Big and small must walk a fine line when it
comes to heritage…BUT, small can take more risk than
big is willing to take and, in the longer run…small will
win this debate. Quoting Mr. Phil Davies, business
development manager of SSTL in an editorial from
Space News, “The main reason that the performance of
small satellites is improving at such a fast rate is their
use of terrestrial electronics. As a result of using such
electronics small satellite performance is improving at
something approximating Moore’s Law.
The
improvements are dramatic…” 10.
If anywhere,
spacecraft technology is advancing at nearly Moore’s
Law pace, how much heritage can any of us afford in
the commercial marketplace?

3.5 The Role of Heritage
The role that heritage should play in space systems is
another major skirmish area between big and small.
Large satellite system programs often have a special
design review known as an EQSR. That is, an
Equipment Qualification Status Review. The purpose
of such a review is to go over every component’s
design history and determine the need for additional
testing or analysis in order to be certain that the
component is ultimately “qualified” for flight BEFORE
it is committed to flight. In a large satellite program an
EQSR is held for every single component. In large
satellite systems, one thing that can immediately qualify
a unit for flight is if it has flight heritage. If the unit
under question has successfully flown before, if the
piece parts from which it was made are still available
from the same manufacturers, and if the unit is
fabricated with the same materials and to the same
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3.6 The Role of Redundancy
The role of redundancy is the final issue of contention
between big and small.
Large space systems frequently use full redundancy.
Everything that can be made redundant, is. In fact
everything that can be made redundant and can be
cross-strapped, is.
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Small satellites use redundancy only when a critical
component has been shown to have an unacceptable
impact upon the system level reliability. Typically,
power supplies and transmitters (both high dissipation
components) are made redundant and, as discussed in
section 3.3.1 of this paper, alternative technology
redundancy is often used - where Side A is a state-ofthe-art component which has risk but, addresses the
competiveness factor we’ve just discussed and Side B is
an older, slower heritage device. [NOTE that this latter
alternative technology redundancy is not true
redundancy, in every case. It may represent a “fail
soft” strategy whereby, if the new, bright and shiny
component fails, and if the heritage part is switched in,
then some loss of performance results.] Ultimately,
small satellites have the potential luxury of using
alternative spacecraft redundancy. If the satellite total
cost (including NRE) can be sufficiently amortized by a
low recurring cost (made possible by mass production)
then this strategy could be valid. This is certainly not
an option for any large spacecraft systems. Launcher
mass availability and cost alone would preclude such a
strategy.

A and B considered in the design? Is it redundant? In
space system designs redundancy should not only be
looked at in terms of reliability but, in terms of cost as
part of a trade. This is just one more reason why big is
non-linearly more expensive than small.
Another issue that surprisingly still remains between
big and small is the use of an old analytical method
used to estimate the system reliability of spacecraft.
Large spacecraft manufacturers persist in using MILHDBK-217, version F or G, or whatever is current, for
reliability calculation. It is still used by big GEO
vendors for calculating “fits” and “9s.” Clearly, if such
an analytical method were valid, no satellite system
using it (which meets the required analytical fit count or
system reliability value) would ever fail to meet its
mission lifetime. But, satellites do sometimes fail to
meet their lifetime objectives.
Even big ones
sometimes fail. And, they fail more often than the
handbook values would predict, all satellite systems
which have used the handbook - taken as a group.
Ergo, MIL-HDBK-217 doesn’t work. It is not that the
analytical methods given by the handbook don’t work.
It’s the data put into the models created that is flawed.
It’s flawed because, by now just about everyone knows
that the real reliability values for components (and subcomponents and particularly, piece parts) cannot be
accurately known or even properly estimated. It’s
curious that the handbook is still used by the satellite
commercial sector when the U.S. Department of
Defense (who originally drafted it) stopped using it
about 25 years ago by Pentagon decree. Even NASA
tends to rely far less on the handbook these days. The
time and energy spent to properly construct and report
the reliability of a satellite system using MIL-HDBK217 is not insignificant when one considers it is applied
in a large program to every component, every
subsystem, and the spacecraft itself. It is another
expense not incurred by SmallSats that the big guys
routinely pay.

Redundancy always has a price. This fact is well
known and frequently ignored. There are frequently
multiple ways in which this price must be paid,
depending upon the redundancy scheme.
In the
simplest case, if two redundant units must be
functionally tested instead of one then it takes twice as
long to do two tests than one. And, these two
functional tests may have to be repeated many times
during a satellite environmental testing program.
That’s obvious enough. But, if the unit is redundant
and cross strapped to two other units the test time is
now 4 X N, where N is the number of environmental
tests requiring a verification of functionality. In actual
fact, I once came across a group of engineers intent
upon making a fault tolerant computer system which
used triple redundancy; fully cross-strapped. Given the
circuit topology with which they proposed to
accomplish their redundancy scheme, they had 27
redundant paths to evaluate.
The system never
happened.

4.0 MARKETS AND APPLICATIONS
So far, we have looked at the distinctions between large
commercial satellite systems and their small satellite
counterparts – particularly with regard to their
performance and design process. We’ve looked at why
small satellites have a surprising comparative advantage
such that the performance of a commercial spacecraft

Another example of hidden cost and risk is also not new
and also pretty obvious…but, worth ramming home
again. If units A and B are redundant, how is the
failure probability of the device that switches between

King

23

25thAnnual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

need not be proportional to the mass, power and volume
differential between the two classes. We’ve looked at
this from a technology perspective and from the
perspective of the development approach that can and is
being taken by both. Neither class of satellite system is
new (as a product). Both classes are still evolving
technologically and business-wise in their own right.
Thus, we cannot claim or make a case that small
satellites have suddenly appeared on the scene. They
have not. They have been around for a pretty long
time; long enough to be held accountable even in the
commercial marketplace. Certainly the same is true for
large systems. And from the perspective of this paper I
am referring primarily to large GEO systems and large
LEO systems used for
non-communications
applications as the points of reference. These large
systems, to be sure, already are being held accountable
for their performance in commercial markets. They are
the benchmark against which SmallSat candidates can
be compared. And the term SmallSat, once again, has
been expanded to include the categories, MiniSat,
MicroSat, NanoSat and PicoSat as evolving
terminology within our industry.

considered in the 1990s only a few constellation FSS
applications were ever filed at the ITU. These included,
in 1994/1995
Teledesic (a broadband system
containing no less than 840 satellites) and in 2000/2001
a French system known as Skybridge (a system using
80 satellites in 1500 km orbits using 20 orbit planes)
which was both a broadband and a digital media
broadcast system but, the satellites in these
constellations (all in the multi-kilowatt range) could
hardly be thought of as small satellites. In any case, in
the end, neither of these systems came to fruition and
the enormous capital costs of these systems always
made the programs dubious with investors. However,
both organizations were instrumental in making
changes to the ITU regulations and introducing the
concept of non-geostationary satellite orbits into the
table of frequency allocations. This paves the way for
future non-GEO and potentially, Smallsat solutions for
the provision of commercial satellite communications.
Entering the FSS marketplace with Smallsats has been
and remains a scaling law problem. This was also
noted in Section 2.3.3. In order to serve the same area
of the Earth with multiple small satellites as one could
do with one GEO, it is necessary to use many small
satellites each contributing EIRP to a select and smaller
portion of the service area in order to establish the same
EIRP density over the total service area. This could
also be done with larger small satellites using multiple
beams. If you work it all out, accounting for the fact
that the LEO smallsats are closer to the Earth and need
less power but, the number of them is larger to cover
the same region of the planet, you lose with a LEO
Smallsat constellation because N Smallsats, each 1/N
as powerful as the GEO are more expensive, because
satellite scaling is not linear [I/Nth of a GEO in
performance doesn’t cost 1/Nth of a GEO - it costs
more than that]. And the satellites move relative to the
Earth as well as the subscribers being served. Thus,
more satellites are once again needed to deal with this
problem. It’s a losing proposition. So, it is not
surprising that there are no such systems. The reality is,
the FSS and BSS market have, since the earliest
commercial satellite days, been dominated by
geostationary satellites, and other means of providing
service are rarely even thought about. It’s simply an
area were small satellites are poorly suited – full stop.
By the way, smallsat GEOs have been thought about
and do exist but, these “small satellites” (used for place

Let’s first look at the traditional commercial markets
where today revenue (and in some cases, profits) are
being made.
4.1 Telecommunications Satellite Systems
Communications satellites were unambiguously the first
market in which any satellite made money. It should be
the first mentioned in any market survey presentation.
4.1.1 Fixed Satellite Service, Broadcast Satellite
Service and Broadband Communications Satellites
This topic is relatively easy to categorize. Despite the
existence of small satellites in the commercial sector for
20 years there have been no commercial initiatives to
provide communications services in the traditional
Fixed Satellite Service or Broadcast Satellite Service
frequency bands whereby the services would be
provided exclusively, or even in part, by small satellite
systems (once again, meaning Microsatellites or
smaller). We know this because such systems must be
licensed and the licensing process in almost every
western country is a public process and applications for
service are circulated publicly. When the notion of
constellation satellite systems began to be seriously
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satellites. For constellations, fielding the 2nd generation
is a major hurdle, as the capital necessary to do this
must come, ultimately from revenues earned from the
first generation system plus new equity and loans – paid
back, eventually, from service revenues from the
second system. So, this is a major achievement,
however, it is accomplished. While it has been a rocky
road for ORBCOMM and while the original team
(written about in books –see Silicon Sky by G. Dorsey)
is no longer around, the dream lives on. And the dream
has been expanded. The older notional digital mobile
message concept has now become known as M2M or
machine-to-machine communications. The focus of
Little LEO is now to remove man from the loop.
Perhaps, this is progress. Or at least it’s packaged
differently.

holders and gap fillers) are still in excess of 1000 watts.
So, for this application, keep your Cubesats in your
pocket.
4.1.2 Mobile Satellite Communications
(GEO; Big and Little LEO Systems)

Systems

The ITU category of service known as Mobile Satellite
Service [which comes in sub-flavors such as Maritime
Mobile Satellite Service (MMSS), Aeronautical Mobile
Satellite Service (AMSS) and Land Mobile Satellite
Service (LMSS)] exist for both GEO and Non-GEO
systems and spectrum exists in these categories because
companies have gone to battle at the ITU to win this
spectrum. The dominant players, some would say, are
still large GEO systems. In MSS, however, there are
serious constellation contenders to the GEOs in the
form of a service known as BIG LEO MSS. This is the
realm of Iridium and Globalstar. These are satellite
constellations with from 66 to 24 satellites (depending
on when you count) which provide global telephone
service and now, ever expanding data services. And
these constellations have significant capacity.
But,
they are BIG LEO systems. The satellites weigh in at
about 700 Kg and produce about 1500 watts of solar
array power at the end of their lifetime. So, these don’t
count as a part of our community of SmallSats.

And, there is a particularly important achievement of
ORBCOMM,
accomplished
along
the
way.
ORBCOMM went public. So far as I’ve been able to
determine ORBCOMM is the first and only Smallsat
company who planned from the onset to build a
business based on Microsatellite technology, raised
money in the market place to do so, did battle
successfully at the ITU in order to start an entirely new
service and then completed a successful Initial Public
Offering. Then, they built and launched the satellite
constellation using OSC satellites and launch vehicles.
So, while MSS in general – for any company in the
business (big or small) - has been marginal – you can
buy shares in ORBCOMM. Check it out. It is the only
Small Satellite stock one can buy on the open market
from a company that started life using small satellites as
a part of their business plan and as their goal. By the
way, just a small aside: The original reason for the
creation of the air launched vehicle (ALV) known as
Pegasus was because OSC wanted to have a means of
launching their own small mobile satellite constellation
into orbit. So, it looks like, for better or for worse,
OSC was successful in what they set out to do
technically – on all counts. It would be nice if there
were a happier ending to this story for the original OSC
investors.

But, there is another service that is active within the
MSS family and it is known as Little LEO. And Little
LEO is the domain of small satellites.
First
championed by Orbital Sciences Corp. (Orbital) who
created the subsidiary ORBCOMM, spectrum was
allocated for this service for data-only mobile
communications (by the ITU in 1992 and by the FCC in
1993).
ORBCOMM launched a constellation of,
ultimately, 38 spacecraft in its first generation. Each
The
weighs 90 lbs and generates 160 watts.
constellation was in full service by 1998 and the first
generation system is still operating today. 13 years
have passed. The system, after a few start-up issues –
works. However, it is a fact that the system, which cost
in excess of $400M on-orbit, filed for Chapter 11
bankrupcy in October of 2000. The original investors
did not prevail and the system survives under new
ownership. The second time around, with a lower cost
base, the system has grown. There are now more than
575,000 subscribers on the ORBCOMM system and the
company is purchasing its second generation of
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There have been other companies that have been
involved in the Little LEO world. SpaceQuest and
VITA are two organizations who have launched
satellites in Little LEO service technically, however,
both of the systems fielded by these two entities
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actually fit better into our next category of commercial
communications satellite system.

good intentions don’t count. We didn’t produce the
goods when the gate was open.

4.1.3 Niche Applications for Communications

Now, however, 20 years after searching the
communications marketplace for niche opportunities it
looks like we have found at least one winner.

It is this communications application where Smallsats
have had great potential. And, despite the great
potential opportunities the Smallsat community has
gotten off to a very slow start. Many applications that
have been identified for decades (from reading water
and electric meters to monitoring the health polar bears)
could have been done by small satellite. They weren’t.
We weren’t fast enough and clever enough to figure it
out. Some of these applications have now been
aggregated by satellites offering MSS services,
including ORBCOMM and their M2M but, many needs
have been satisfied by NASA satellites or weren’t
served by satellite at all. Perhaps the best example of a
missed opportunity by the community was in
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA).
SCADA is a term used primarily by the oil and gas
industry. A very large number of valve manipulations
and pipeline measurements are needed in that industry.
Of course, originally these were done manually. By the
late 1970s that industry was looking for an automated
solution to SCADA. Oil and gas fields close to urban
centers could use wireline solutions, however, more
remote locations could have made use of small satellite
data relay as their solution. But, we weren’t there with
the needed solution in the right time window. By the
time most of us figured out how to solve various
spectrum allocation and system financing problems
(having a technical solution in our hands) the petroleum
industry figured out that a variation to a form of packet
radio would allow them to relay their data from one end
of a vast oil field to another – via ground radio and then
relay the aggregate block of data from one single point
via VSAT terminal or microwave link to a central
location. Arguably, some amount of this business may
ultimately revert back to the Little LEO satellite
systems as time impacts the technology cost equations
but, the initial market need was satisfied by means other
than via satellite. It was a definite opportunity missed.
To be fair, it hasn’t always been that opportunities were
missed because our community wasn’t trying or wasn’t
aware (SCADA being a case in point) but, in business,
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AIS: AIS, is an Automated Identification System and a
tracking system for ships. The International Maritime
Organization's (IMO) International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) requires AIS to be fitted
aboard international voyaging ships with gross
tonnage (GT) of 300 or more tons, and all passenger
ships regardless of size. While originally intended as a
VHF line-of-sight system, the small satellite community
realized that, with certain limitations and with clever
technology, it would be possible to extent the range of
the system from line-of-sight (really meaning about 75
km range) to a global system. Many markets exist for
the data, even beyond local port authority monitoring of
equipped vessels. Both Microsats and Nanosat versions
of in-orbit AIS receivers have appeared in orbit very
rapidly.
Two major players, ORBCOMM and
COMDEV have fielded trial payloads on
Microsatellites using two different technical
approaches. ORBCOMM detects and analyzes the
signals on-board, while COMDEV post-processes their
received data on the ground. As AIS was originally
intended only for local use, this adaptive TDM system
cannot be used as-is by satellites, since the thousand of
ships in view (as seen from orbit) produce too many
packet collisions, resulting in significant data loss. The
system occupies only a single VHF channel. However,
these collisions can largely be sorted out by Doppler
discrimination or by other proprietary methods and that
can be achieved on-board the spacecraft or on the
ground.
While these two larger companies have been competing
for this new marketplace, a consortium of Norwegian
organizations, working with Space Flight Laboratories
of the University of Toronto (UTIAS) has launched
AISsat as another entry into this market. AISsat is a
Nanosat. The system is up and running and working
with excellent performance. Results will be reported at
this conference.
The U.S. company SpaceQuest has also been involved
in AIS from the beginning of AIS space tracking.
Using an on-board processing and decoding techniques
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and a simplified hertitage Nanosat platform,
SpaceQuest launched an AIS “transponder” in 2007
and brought the VHF AIS signal composite down on an
analog link at S-Band. Having the signal structure
available to analyze on the ground, allowed them to
determine the key characteristics of an on-board
decoder system. In July of 2009 they launched two
spacecraft (ApriseSats 3 and 4) which have AIS
receiver/decoders that are now operational and provide
daily data returns from 25,000 unique vessels every
day.
SpaceQuest expects to launch more of these
spacecraft in 2011, 2012 and 2013, showing that even a
small business can finally compete in the larger
marketplace using Nanosat technology. 12, 13

Despite my own personal drive, energies and
enthusiasm put into this arena over many years, current
Smallsat (meaning very specifically microsatellites and
smaller systems) results are rather disappointing. As
was pointed out in section 2.2.3 above, small satellites
of this class cannot compete with traditional large GEO
systems due to fundamental EIRP limitations and
reasons were pointed out why simple or even clever
satellite proliferation is not really a very good or cheap
answer either. Despite these limitations there are any
number of communications niche markets that present
themselves from time-to-time and are suitable for entry
by SmallSats and yet, their exploitation has been slow
on the uptake. And, there is no shortage of advanced
available technology to do the job; quite the contrary. It
is gratifying that AIS has truly taken off and is very
competitive. This helps resurrect my earlier (2009)
opinion about the telecommunications markets. The
fact that ORBCOMM has struggled through incredible
obstacles and survives today, as a public company, is
also encouraging. These examples show that it is
possible to make money with Small Satellites.

This will not be the end of the AIS space systems
deployed as ESA and other individual European
countries are also developing receivers for small
satellite platforms.
We find in this example what we should find in any
vibrant marketplace – competition. Not something
we’ve seen a lot of within our community in the
services sector. However, there is a special kind of
competition within AIS. Note that the bigger guys (in
this case, COMDEV and ORBCOMM) are using
Microsatellite technology while the smaller players are
using Nanosat technology. And, to me as an unbiased
observer, the results look about the same among all of
the techniques being employed so, the best bang for the
buck, looks like the Nanosat solutions. Perhaps I’m
missing something, however, one can imagine that we
aren’t too far away from using 3U or even 1U
Cubesat/Picosat technology for the next generation AIS
system. In the end, as in all markets the best product
with the lowest price will prevail. This is an exciting
outcome in the Telecommunications satellite field. In
the end, however, it may be value added services that
discriminate these competitors, since the markets that
consume the AIS data are vast and not at all those that
you might first expect. For example, commodity
traders are using this data to evaluate the distribution of
world energy at every instant in time and at every
location as an aid to setting short term (spot) oil prices.
It is also likely that this application will show a merger
of terrestrial and space technologies to provide holistic
solutions to global transportation problems via the high
seas.
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4.2 Earth Observation Satellite Systems
By “Earth observation” I include all remote sensing
satellites that image the Earth. I do not include here
other kinds of sensors that may observe the Earth in
some other way. I’ll include those instruments in a
separate category. The results in this category are more
favorable
than
the
results-to-date
in
telecommunications. Having stated this, I’m fairly
certain that it is still a rare occasion when, in the Earth
Observation/Remote Sensing world a SmallSat dollar of
profit is made.
For the moment, let’s focus on markets other than the
more dubious meteorological market as that one is so
heavily dominated by government agencies worldwide
that it is difficult to assess prospects even for large
systems, let alone small ones. Thus, we are referring
here to panchromatic and multispectral imaging
systems that use wavelengths between the IR and the
high end of the visible range (or, possiblly long UV
range).
The first such satellites were large satellites. Landsat
was the first. It wasn’t originally commercial but, the
system has tried to turn commercial but, with great
difficulty. No wonder. The second system, which is
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commercial today, is Spot Image of France. It is a large
system. Early satellites were built by Matra of France.
Time moved on, slowly. The next to enter the market
was Digital Globe with eventually three large satellites:
QuickBird, WorldView-1 and WorldView-2. After
Digital Globe, the next to enter the market were
OrbView (an OSC company using OSC medium sized
spacecraft) and Space Imaging.
Space Imaging
launched a large and well publicized satellite called
IKONOS. Space Imaging was a spinoff of LockheedMartin and Raytheon. So, no surprise, IKONOS was
certainly not a SmallSat system. In 2005, OrbView and
Space Imaging merged and formed the survivor
company, SpaceImage. NOTE: Both companies had
filed Chapter 11 prior to the merger. So, apparently,
even the government markets for sub-meter resolution
images were insufficient for the two of these companies
to survive in competition.

May of 2003. This policy allowed commercial remote
sensing companies to provide to the open market (under
certain conditions) imagery with a resolution below 1.0
meters for the first time. The certain conditions have to
do with companies providing the government with a
right-of-review, in some cases, before the imagery is
released. This greatly increased activity and interest in
the Earth imaging markets.
A final large satellite player entered the market in 2008.
LAND Info with sub-meter imaging using a satellite
called GeoEye-1.
The above is the large satellite playing field as it is
today, although there are more international players
than are mentioned here. Russia, Israel, India and
China all have quasi-commercial offerings available.
Table 6 summarizes the system capabilities of the
companies mentioned above.

The U.S. government, under the Bush administration,
introduced a relaxed remote sensing space policy in

Table 6: Large Earth Imaging Spacecraft Characteristics
SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS:
OPERATING ENTITY:

Spacecraft:

M.S. Resolution (m):

PAN. Resolution (m):

Launch Mass (Kg):

Platform EOL Power (W):

Spacecraft Design Lifetime (years):

Landsat-7

15-60 m

15

2250

2600

10 years (beyond design life)

SPOT Image

SPOT-5

20-10 m

10-5 m

3030

>1500

5 (beyond design life)

Digital Globe

Quickbird

2.4

0.61

955

>2000

7.25

Worldview-1

1.84

0.50

Full ∆II 7920 L/V

>2000

7

Worldview-2

1.84

0.46

Full ∆II 7920 L/V

>2000

7.25

Orbimage (Space Imaging +ORBVIEW)IKONOS-1,-2

3.28

0.82

818

>1500

7

OBRVIEW 3,4

8.0

1.0 - 4.0

304

625

5

GeoEye-1

1.65

0.41

1955

3860

7 years w. 0.75 Sys. Rel.

Landsat

LANDInfo . (+ Google)

Nigeria and the UK. In 2005 China purchased a 5th
DMC satellite from SSTL. Eventually, China also
joined the consortium. That spacecraft is now known
as Beijing-1. This added a satellite to the constellation,
however, it is a slightly larger spacecraft weighing
approximately 150 Kg. This spacecraft contains not
only the standard 32 m GSD multi-spectral (3 band)
imager but, also a 4m GSD panchromatic imager as
well. Each DMC spacecraft contains the standard 32 m
GSD multi-spectral camera plus one additional imaging
instrument of the customer’s own choosing. The

Approaching remote sensing from an entirely different
perspective, in 2002 and 2003 Surrey Satellite
Technology Limited (SSTL) launched a constellation of
four satellites each weighing approximately 100 Kg
each. Each spacecraft contains a Multispectral imager
with a resolution of 32 meters and a scan width of 600
km. The spacecraft, taken together are known as the
Disaster Monitoring Constellation (DMC).
Each
spacecraft was purchased by a different client country.
The initial members of the DMC consortium (formed
by the purchasing countries) were Algeria, Turkey,

King

28

25thAnnual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

satellite orbits are arranged as a “string-of-pearls” and
are spaced to give a one day repeat ground track. The
countries who purchased the satellites have agreed to
share the resources of the constellation and, in fact, sell
imaging products to interested customers through a
SSTL subsidiary DMCii (DMC International Imaging)
as well as using the imagery for their own purposes.
The DMC system trades resolution and a wide swath
width for reduced revisit time. As its name suggests,
the purpose of the constellation is to provide imagery
for the monitoring of disasters and wide area
dynamically changing events. The spectral bands
chosen and the swath width are ideal for disaster
monitoring.
Images from the Beijing-1 4 m
panchromatic camera are also for sale. An example of
this imager’s capability (arguably, after image
processing) is shown in Figure 11. To get the full
impact of this amazing step forward have a look at
Figure 12. Figure 12a is a photo of the SPOT-2 Earth
Imaging spacecraft preparing for launch on an Ariane-4
in Kourou. If you look carefully below the SPOT

spacecraft you will see several very small secondary
payloads in that image. The largest of these is an SSTL
satellite that is in the same general size class as the
DMC spacecraft. Figure 12c is a photo showing three
SSTL spacecraft affixed to the Ariane-ASAP secondary
payload ring at much closer range. These are the same
size SSTL-70 spacecraft platforms as the one seen in
12a. These spacecraft are about 30% smaller than the
standard DMC spacecraft and about 50% smaller than
the spacecraft that took the Figure 11 image. The
Beijing-1 spacecraft, after completion of integration is
shown in Figure 13. One cannot help but notice the
size of the primary instrument aperture in comparison
to the total spacecraft size. There seems to be very little
spacecraft to point a lot of imager. Staying with the
SPOT Image juxtaposition, we can compare Beijing-1
to SPOT 5, the most recently launch SPOT Image
satellite (May 2002). See the summary in Table 7.
Information for this table was taken from a variety of
website
sources.

Figure 11: 4m Resolution Image from Beijing-1
King
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12 a

12 b

12 c

Figure 12: SPOT-2 vs. DMC Satellite Comparison

Figure 13: Beiging-1 DMC Spacecraft
Table 7: SPOT-5 vs. Beijing-1 (DMC)
Parameter:
Mass
Power
Panchromatic Resolution (Raw)
Multispectral Resolution (Raw)
Estimated Cost

SPOT Image - SPOT-5
3030 Kg
>1,500 Watts Orbit Average
5m
20 m
>$680M

To be fair, the geometric distortion of images from the
larger more expensive spacecraft is lower than those
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DMC - Beijing-1
150 Kg
110 Watts Orbit Average
4m
32 m
<$15M

from these low cost missions. So, the markets for the
imagery from the two classes of system are not quite
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the same. Nor were they intended to be. Presently,
these disparate classes of space systems serve quite
different markets. However, it is not very difficult to
see where all of this is all headed.

agricultural Earth observation market sector. They
intend to expand into the forestry, energy &
infrastructure, spatial solutions, environmental solutions
and security and emergency markets. RapidEye has
benefited from a public/private partnership with DLR,
the German space agency. They were also co-funded
for the development of the space segment by the
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).

In 2008, a firm called RapidEye AG took delivery from
SSTL of five Earth observation satellites. These
spacecraft were also intended to be flown as a
constellation in order to significantly reduce revisit time
to any location on Earth.
In this case MDA
(MacDonald, Dettweiler & Associates, Ltd.) of Canada
acted as prime contractor for the system and SSTL
provided the platform. The imagers were designed and
fabricated by Jena-Optronik, GmbH of Germany. The
five spacecraft were successfully launched (on one
DNEPR launch vehicle) and were placed into service in
August of 2008. The spacecraft (RE-1 through RE-5)
are identical and carry 3-band multispectral imagers
with a resolution of 8 meters. Each satellite’s mass is
120 Kg and the platform produces just over 100 Watts
of orbit average power. This program was a $100M
effort for five spacecraft. RapidEye AG is a firm with
long standing contracts for image analysis in the

So, now there are not just one but two, very serious
entrants into the Earth Observation market using,
indeed depending upon, small satellite technology.
The bottom line in the Earth Observation market, given
good quality control of the data product, is the price of
the image per unit area. Tables 8A and 8B are an
attempt to show how well Earth observation companies
using SmallSat technology can compete within the
overall market. It is worth noting that DMCii has
made sufficient revenue to purchase one additional
DMC second generation spacecraft which has now been
launched as the sixth satellite in the constellation. This
bodes well for the business success of the entity.

Table 8A: Large Earth Imaging Product Pricing
System:

Product:

Orbimage:
SPOT Image:

Price Base:

Archived Image
(1986-2006)

Minimum Order:

$0.70/km²

Depends on Sat.
Viewing Angle
400-3600 km²

$0.44/km²

$1.00/km²

Level 1A, 1B,2A
20m Color
10m B&W

Orthorectification

+$260/image

Orthorectification

+$260/image

50 cm - 1.65 m
PAN, PSM or MS
GEO (Non-Ortho)

$25.00/km²

1m - 4m
PAN, PSM or MS
GEO (Non-Ortho)

$20.00/km

50 cm - 1.65 m
PAN, PSM or MS
GEO Professional
Orthorectification
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Price Base:

NO COMMERCIL PRICING AVAILABLE ON WEB

Level 1A, 1B,2A
10m Color
5m B&W

GeoEye:
(Landinfo)

Product:

$30.00/km²

1m - 4m
PAN, PSM or MS
GEO Professional
Orthorectification
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Table 8B: SmallSat Earth Image Product Pricing
System:
DMCii:

RapidEye:

Product:
Programmed
32 M; 3 Band MS
Archived
32 M; 3 Band MS
< 1 year old
>1 year old
4m PAN
Standard from Kiosk
8m; MS

Price Base:
$0.164/km²

Product:
Orthorectification

Minimum Order:

Minimum Area:
160 km X 160 km
$0.063/km²
$0.018/km²

Orthorectification
Orthorectification
Call For Price

+$734/image
+$734/image

$2.50/km²

$65 min.

Standard from Library
8m; MS

$1.25/km²

$3300 min.

On Demand
8m; MS

$1.25/km²

$6600 min.

Geo Corrected
Level 2A

Call for Price

Orto Corrected
Level 3A

Call for Price

a much lower cost data product for weather forecasters.
Other clients for mature data from remote sensing
instruments exist. The airline industry is an example of
a potential consumer for certain specialized weather
prediction data products. But, one needs an “anchor
tenant” for such businesses. And, that customer must
first embrace the value of the new remote sensing
information in the context of improved weather
prediction/forecasting. Realize also, that the same
organizations that predict weather also develop their
own instruments to predict or forecast weather (NOAA
and NASA, working together, are a prime example).
This puts emerging remote sensing technology in
immediate competition with sensors being developed
by these agencies if the government instruments might
happen to measure anything similar to the data products
being proposed by the entrepreneur. Also realize that
such organizations have been around for a very long
time and are conservative by nature. The National
Weather Service, the forecasting branch of NOAA is,
interestingly enough, the most sued organization in the
United States. They are sued; it seems, by everyone
who has a “bad day” when a weather forecast is less

4.3 Remote Sensing (Non-Imaging) Satellite
Systems
We have a slight problem with terminology in this area.
Nearly everyone would agree that remote sensing
includes Earth imaging. However, the intent in this
section is to describe commercial mission efforts using
instruments that sense the Earth in some way but, do
not image the Earth. Thus, I will refer to this class of
systems as simply “Remote Sensing (Non-Imaging). “
Since the 1980s when SmallSat technology became
feasible for non-imaging remote sensing commercial
missions, several initiatives have been tried. Most of
the instruments of interest in this category measure
quantities that would be generally categorized as
meteorological. Thus, the primary customers for such
data products are government meteorological
organizations around the world. NOAA is the best U.S.
example and the European Centre for Medium Range
Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) is a European example.
And, as it turns out, such government organizations
don’t always make the best clients for emerging remote
sensing technology, even if the entrepreneur might offer
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Price Base:
+$734/image
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than accurate. This would explain why NWS is
conservative. Now we begin to see the stage that an
entrepreneurial remote sensing CEO would have to
occupy as he/she strides into the NOAA
Administrator’s office with a bright new idea for a
service that, once installed, would improve weather
prediction and save taxpayer dollars.

Ware developed an instrument (a specialized GPS
receiver with specialized antennas) that was then flown
on a target of opportunity mission offered by Orbital
Sciences Corp. The target mission, called Microlab-1
was executed as planned and the instrument (called
GPS-MET) worked wonderfully well. All, including
NSF, NCAR, NOAA and NASA/JPL were impressed
with the proof-of-concept data. Time went by. It was
very difficult for Exner and Ware to convince
NWS/NOAA, the obvious client for the data, to sponsor
an operational set of small satellites. The ideal system
would be a mini-constellation of SmallSats carrying the
receivers in a near polar orbit. Such a system would
produce thousands of occultations per day distributed
fairly evenly around the globe. The real time nature of
the data set was determined to be sufficiently good to
predict winds and wind gradients over ocean areas, as
well. Wind vectors and wind gradients, particularly
over ocean areas, are data products that have long been
sought after by forecasters.

Several instruments that fit this general scenario have
been offered, none-the-less.
These include small
satellite scatterometers, radar and laser altimeters,
radiometers and various forms of what has generally
been categorized as GPS Occultation Receivers. Other
kinds of instruments such as various space weather
detection devices and even earthquake detection sensors
have also made attempts at starting new niche markets
of one sort or another. None have been successful so
far.
Perhaps the best attempt, to date, was made by two
entrepreneurs who also happen to work at the National
Center for Atmospheric Research in Boulder, Colorado.
By name they were Mike Exner and Randolph Ware.
In fact, they worked for a spin-off of NCAR known as
UCAR, the University Center for Atmospheric
Research.
Both of them were fascinated by the
opportunities being opened by the GPS system (once
Selective Availability was turned off). Mike and
Randolph had worked with JPL on research which
demonstrated, as with any planetary atmosphere (the
JPL connection comes in here), a radio wave
transmitted from outside the Earth’s atmosphere will
bend toward the normal as it passes through the
ionosphere and atmosphere of that planet. This process,
of course, is simply, RF diffraction. If the signal source
happens to be a very well calibrated source in both
phase and frequency (like GPS) then a satellite in LEO
orbit can observe this ray diffraction whenever a GPS
satellite rises or sets on the LEO’s horizon. Since there
are lots of GPS satellites (and there could be lots of
LEOs containing a receiver to make such
measurements) then such a system of LEOs and GPSs
could observe many risings and settings (called
occultations) every day. The precise amount of bending
of the ray (measured in terms of phase and frequency
change of the GPS signal), it turns out, allows a very
precise measurement of temperature and relative
humidity as a function of precise altitude. Working
with a variety of small companies and JPL, Exner and
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Exner and Ware, after trying to make the economics of
their venture work domestically but, without the U.S.
weather forecasting community finally decided to try
another tack. The business case did not close. It turns
out the country of Taiwan is very interested in weather
forecasting. This has something to do with the
Typhoons that rack their shores every few months, one
supposes. NCAR has a long standing relationship with
Taiwanese weather forecasters and with NSPO, the
National Space Planning Organization of Taiwan.
NSPO was interested, in fact motivated, to find a
mission that would provide some scientific return that
would help Taiwan and at the same time had potential
commercial viability.
What emerged was
apublic/private partnership and a mission called
COSMIC (Constellation Observing System for
Meteorology, Ionosphere and Climate). The mission
was developed largely by NSPO using $80M of Taiwan
funding and $20M in U.S. funds to construct six
Microsatellites, each carrying a GPS occultation
receiver. Two other smaller instruments are also onboard the COSMIC satellites. In Taiwan, the system is
now also known as FORMOSAT-3. Eventually, the
constellation was launched in 2006. The satellite
platform contract went to OSC in the U.S. but, the
spacecraft were integrated by NSPO engineers and
technicians in Taiwan. The GPS receivers, I believe,
were provided by JPL. They are known in JPL circles
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as “turbo-rogue” receivers.
Taken together, the
constellation has observed over 2.9 million GPS
occultations to date, providing a wealth of precise
altitude temperature data as well as space weather data
products pertaining to the E and F layers of the
ionosphere. No such similar capability exits: a clear
success for SmallSats. The spacecraft weigh 70 Kg
each and are based on the ORBCOMM platform design.

satellites will use different instruments, which could
still be categorized as Remote Sensing (Non-imaging).
Perhaps the Taiwanese government gave NSPO another
last-last chance? There doesn’t look to be too much
room for entrepreneurs here either.
There is a new initiative involving space weather
missions. NSF is funding a series of space weather
payloads and platforms by means on an annual
“Cubesat-based Science Missions for Space Weather
and Atmospheric Research” solicitation. The first
solicitation was initiated in 2009 and it appears that the
program will be re-funded annually. Early results
appear promising. The University of Michigan RAX
mission is the first of these missions to obtain orbit.
While the spacecraft encountered a premature failure of
its solar array, this did not occur until the instrument
had been calibrated using a real PAVE PAWS radar
signal. It is clear that there will be other Cubesat
spacecraft to follow carrying an array of space weather
instruments. This is an excellent outcome, generally
but, it doesn’t really say anything new about the
potential for Cubesats or Nanosats to make money in
the marketplace. There is the possibility, however, that
if one of the space weather data products has a long
term value, particularly in forecasting, then it may be
commercially viable to provide that data service by
means of the “data buy” mechanism mentioned above
so far as the U.S. is concerned, or via a similar means in
other countries.
Once again, a Public/Private
partnership, if it really worked, could be employed.

But what happened to the entrepreneurs, Michael Exner
and Randolph “Stick” Ware and their corporate venture
to sell GPS occultation data to the meteorological
community? Well, who knows where they are today?
The governments of Taiwan and the United States
managed to make sure that the project became a
government program within their respective domains.
No small company was set up, as promised, to process
and provide data to the government forecasters around
the world. No private capital was ever even allowed to
be raised so that the system raw data and processed
services could be offered on a commercial basis. Even
though Exner and Ware managed to get the U.S.
congress to set aside funding from NOAA and NSF
creating a process called a “data buy” (whereby the
government can procure data from a private firm who
can offer special, one-of-a-kind data or information to
those needing it within the government), NOAA and
NSF never used that feature to obtain GPS occultation
information. Even though an American company, with
a sister organization in Taiwan would have been ready
to approach the capital markets to fund the venture
themselves, it never happened. This ends my sad tale
about GPS-MET and the adventures of two remote
sensing entrepreneurs. [NOTE: World governments 2; SmallSat entrepreneurs – 0].
This story ends
curiously: NSPO, it turns out, was set up under
Taiwanese law, not to build satellites but, to fund spacebased applications that could be spun-off into the public
sector so that the funding would create jobs and
economic opportunities in Taiwan. FORMOSAT-3
(COSMIC) was NSPO’s “last chance” to accomplish a
successful spinoff. It’s curious how things turn out
sometimes, isn’t it? Anyway, it is a success story for
small satellites, just not for commercial small satellites.
You can read about how this venture progresses on the
web.11 It’s an on-going saga. The latest from the
COSMIC website, www.cosmic.ucar.edu is that there
will be a FORMOSAT 7/COSMIC-2 collaborative
between NSPO and NOAA but, this constellation of 6
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Thus, there is no really good news to report in the
commercial category: Remote Sensing (Non-Imaging).
This category gets a zero in the matrix for now but,
there is potential promise for the future. There is room
for some optimism – but, not much.
4.4 Small Satellites and Science as a Commercial
Business
This too has been tried. It has been shown definitively,
by way of an existence proof, that small satellites can
do good science. The Canadian MOST project is
probably the most successful and productive example.
How can this process be turned into a commercial
business? The late Jim Benson, founder of SpaceDev,
had a few good ideas in this regard and perhaps, some
we shouldn’t talk about as well. One of his good ideas
failed, unfortunately, in the execution phase. The idea
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is simple enough in principle. If one builds a
reasonably standard bus or platform, much like SSTL
has done with their SSTL-70 or SSTL-100 product,
then it is possible for an enterprising company, given
the availability of such a product, to approach a
principle investigator (PI) [typically a professor at a
university] and form a partnership with the university.
A joint proposal could then be submitted at the time of
the next satellite mission proposal opportunity (e.g.
NASA or ESA solicitation). They would work as a
team. The thought process here is logical. More often
than not, PIs and universities are not satellite platform
experts and having to do all of the non-recurring
development of a space platform at the university
would add unnecessary cost to a program. Of course,
large spacecraft suppliers can and do do the same thing
but, their bus products are more expensive. Even some
companies (Ball Aerospace comes to mind) specialize
in medium to small sized science spacecraft and they
are a significant competitive force for the far less well
known SmallSat companies. The real advantage of a
SmallSat science approach is that the cost of the overall
mission is low enough that the spacecraft can be
dedicated to (i.e. focused upon) a single mission
purpose – a single instrument spacecraft mission – no
design compromises would be necessary.

side science). Some may think that NSF could provide
funding for science instruments or spacecraft. This is,
generally, incorrect. [NOTE: With the Space Weather
solicitations, this may be changing and it is good news.]
We also note that NASA builds spacecraft platforms for
scientific instruments. NASA/GSFC in its hay-day
built dozens of these spacecraft.
Thus, the
entrepreneurial SmallSat bus provider finds itself
competing directly with NASA, in offering a bus that
NASA, particularly one of its field centers, might also
want to build. Certain mission categories have been set
up by NASA Headquarters so that a PI can, in fact,
team with a bus supplier to put forward a single
instrument or small number of instrument mission.
Two categories or classes of missions come to mind:
SMEX and UNEX. SMEX simply means small
explorer. Several SMEX missions were launched and
were quite successful.
These missions are not
SmallSats per se, but, the spacecraft are only slightly
larger than the top end of the microsatellite range. Most
would be considered Mini-Sats.
Usually, the
instrument PI resides at a university and the PM is at
NASA (in this case NASA/GSFC). The problem for
the participating platform supplier is one of “oversight.”
Extreme oversight one might argue. The platform
“supplier,” in fact, becomes an engineering support
services organization to NASA. All primary design
decisions are made by the government. All design
reviews are scheduled and planned by the government.
All procedures and processes are reviewed and
modified by the government. The resulting product is
very unlikely to bear any resemblance to the proposal
that was submitted by the platform vendor and there is
no profit motive for the entrepreneur anywhere to be
seen. One might make money by creating change order
modifications to fixed price contracts but, there’s very
little “up-side” there. In any case, the government has
now cancelled this mission category and has gone back
to the old Explorer Mission concept.

The problem that arises first: such an approach is not
traditional. Traditionally, NASA flies what could be
called “theme” missions. All PIs that have developed
instruments which support or lend credibility to a
particular theme, and may provide the answer to yet
another riddle of the cosmic puzzle, are invited to
propose. This scenario, while increasing mission risk,
makes considerable sense in the context of instrument
synergy. One instrument may not answer a certain
scientific question but, two or three instruments, each of
which measures a synergistic quantity, may indeed
answer the scientific question. So, there is little room
here for SmallSats performing theme missions unless
the PI instruments are all very small and not very power
hungry. This is somewhat unlikely.

UNEX means university explorer. This was the same
concept as SMEX only smaller and it did cater to
Microsatellites and smaller spacecraft. The PI was to
be king and NASA was to have an arms-length
involvement in the spacecraft development. That was
the plan. The only spacecraft successfully developed
under the UNEX program was ChipSat (discussed in
section 2.1 above). ChipSat was a very successful
spacecraft with a good instrument. But, once again the

The problem that arises next: We all know you can
never have the fox watching the chicken coop.
Consider the following: NASA funds PIs to provide
scientific instruments for spacecraft. And no one else
in the government does (we ignore a similar path in the
DoD here where USAF plays a role – let’s stick to civil
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issue that emerged as the real process for UNEX
unfolded at NASA was the same as always. The fox
could not keep his eye off of the chickens. The
oversight on ChipSat was devastating. SpaceDev, the
platform contractor, was new, energetic and innovative.
The ChipSat proposed management scheme, which was
agreed to by NASA/GSFC and Berkeley at the
beginning of the program, had a limited number of
design reviews, the peer process was a key element of
the system strategy and the platform contractor was to
have free reign in key design elements of the bus,
particularly where they did not impact the instrument
development. The contract was FFP and was based on
the above assumptions being true. The fastest way to
summarize what went on over the two plus year
development of ChipSat is to review the cost impact of
NASA’s actions taken to contain SpaceDev’s free
thinking. The FFP for the platform was initially
approved at about 4 million dollars. At the end of the
program the figure for the platform alone was
approaching 8 million dollars (due to change order
modifications, one would presume). The number of
design reviews held had more than doubled. The
oversight from NASA/GSFC was intense and
continuous. This was not a happy experience for any
party involved. Some of SpaceDev’s ideas were
ultimately accepted as being novel and useful. Most of
those had to be fought for ruthlessly. All of the ChipSat
satellite engineers working at SpaceDev have left the
company. Some of them left the aerospace industry at
the end of the program.
The Berkeley PI left the
university and now teaches high school in the Berkeley
area. All of the Berkeley and SpaceDev engineers
contributed significantly to a program that produced the
first U.S. SmallSat to provide accurate 3-axis attitude
control and the first U.S. satellite to communicate
directly via the Internet. All involved were excellent,
young spacecraft engineers.
The program was
considered by everyone to be a success. The UV
spectrometer Berkeley created worked fine but, most
astronomers consider ChipSat to be an example of a
negative science mission. The short wavelength UV
photons predicted by the astronomy community were
not observed in the numbers expected during the all sky
survey with the instrument developed and fabricated by
Berkeley.
Negative science; the absence of
observables; can be good science and ChipSat is
considered by the astronomy community to be an
example of a good but, negative scientific results.
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However, such a mission is not always the most
exciting thing to work on. It is most unfortunate that
the negative science aspect of ChipSat was combined
with a bad platform development experience. NASA,
for its part, cancelled the UNEX program outright after
ChipSat was completed. I guess we can simply
say…commercial space science (or something
approximating it) just got off to a bad start.
I should try to leave this topic on a more optimistic
note. It may be possible in the future to create a more
innovative and rewarding commercial opportunity in
the space science area. It is likely that a viable business
model for cooperation between industry and
universities on scientific missions can be developed.
But, first we must either kill the fox or move the
chickens. Perhaps our government should consider rearranging science instrument and research funding so
that it is managed by the National Science Foundation
(or a similar organization), leaving NASA to fund space
and air flight technology research. [NOTE: In fact, for
the first time, in 2009, with it’s Nanosat space weather
solicitation NFS has done exactly that. One can hope
that the U.S. government will extend this approach to a
larger range of space missions with larger implied
budgets.] In effect, under this concept, NASA would
become more nearly a pure engineering research
organization, leaving science to other qualified
agencies. This would at least eradicate what appears to
be a clear conflict of interest if viewed from the
perspective of the commercial private sector. It then
should be possible to set up a process whereby mission
standards are adopted so that space science does not
always have to reinvent the wheel every time a mission
flies (or at least not so much of the time). Europe,
Japan, China and other space player nations should
adopt a similar approach. ESA is every bit as heavy
handed in its dealings with scientists as NASA is, and
even more expensive. Eventually, as Jim Benson
envisioned, space will be explored by adventurers and
contractors that have a profit motive for going into
space. We may or may not like the mental image this
summons in our mind, however, it has been our past
way of proceeding on planet Earth and it may
necessarily be our future path as we head outward away
from home.
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and provide seed capitalization? Answer: How about
Bill and Larry Gross (of Google fame) who collectively
own Idealab and how about Steven Spielberg (an
investor only) and how about James Cameron (as an
investor and an active participant). You could also
throw in Bob Weiss the former director of the movie
“Blues Brothers” and Tony Spear the JPL Program
Manager of the highly successful Mars Pathfinder
mission. You add to that august group a team of 40 top
rate spacecraft engineers and managers; veterans of JPL
deep space missions and successful small satellite
missions and finally there is a “sprinkling” of
Hollywood high tech animators and model builders and
camera experts. Many small satellite subcontractors
and even astronauts were then added as consultants.
Now, what do you have?

4.5 Entertainment, Education and Training Satellite
Systems as a Commercial Business
Satellites, particularly small ones, have been used for
the education and training of individuals (young and
old) in the aerospace arts since the beginning of the
space age in the late 1950s. Until recently providing
satellites, satellite components, satellite ground stations
or even training software/documentation has not really
been thought of as a money making activity. One does
not seriously conjure up entrepreneurial thoughts as one
thinks about educational space systems. There are
currently at least five companies selling Cubesats,
Cubesat and Nanosat parts and Satellite Training
Devices that are really satellites that don’t fly (instead,
they stay in the class room and send telemetry and
receive commands from student laptop ground stations).
We can call the providers of these tools commercial
companies but, I’d rather think of them as spending
creative time in the interest of supporting the future of
the aerospace industry. I don’t think educational or
training systems will ever be big money making
ventures but, I’m very pleased that educational satellites
exist and I’m very proud to have played an active role
in this arena of space technology.

BlastOff!
The year was 1999. BlastOff! the company was set up
from the onset to be an Internet delivered streaming
media entertainment company. The entertainment was
to be live video from the moon (that would be the first
mission). The spacecraft was to be of a unique design
as it would have to be both a lander and a rover. That
has never been done before so it was a tremendous and
exciting challenge. The spacecraft was very small and
the total propellant mass fraction had to be carefully
managed. To make the mission meaningful back on
Earth (to those watching over the Internet) there would
not just be a camera suite on the “mother” lander/rover
but, there would also be two scout rover vehicles both
carrying cameras to look back at the mother and record
her motions. As I recall, this concept was one of James
Cameron’s main contributions to the mission concept.
To make the mission totally appealing the mother was
to land as near as possible to an Apollo landing site ( I
believe the Apollo 16 site was preferred due to its
interesting terrain). And, as you’ve now guessed, that
mother and the two scouts were to traverse from the
landing spot to the LM decent stage and revisit the
scene of that great historic event. Everything about the
mission was to be “monetized” (a cute dot.com term
from that time). There would be logos all over the
vehicle (except where the thermal control materials and
solar panels had to be). There were to be student
“sponsored” experiments that would be carried out on
the moon. There were to be country sponsored flags at
appropriate places on various pieces of hardware.

Entertainment spacecraft! What a topic this is. By the
way, it should be noted that within the concept of
entertainment systems we could certainly add education
and training. Good entertainment, I think, is almost
always educational and could provide some form of
training.
In discussing entertainment systems, we certainly have
to clarify what we are referring to in the context of big
and small. Large GEO satellites carry TV and audio
programming that is clearly intended for entertainment.
However, that’s not what is intemated here. In this
context, the satellite itself is a form of entertainment.
And, yes, this concept too has been tried. And, there is
a spectacular example of an attempt to provide an
entertainment spacecraft and create a satellite
entertainment “empire,” …well nearly an empire.
It has to be ask, if one wanted to start a deep space
entertainment satellite empire…where would one start?
Answer: How about Pasadena, CA; not far from JPL,
not far from Hollywood and in the middle of a hotbed
of dot.com entrepreneurial activity. And, then one asks,
who might be good candidates to start such a company
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remaining, all of the engineers in the company stopped
work on the spacecraft and went into fund raising
mode. At that time nearly $20M had been spent and
another $30M or more was needed to get to launch.
Everyone worked frantically in an effort to save
BlastOff! But, a month was not enough time to raise
that sort of capital (as any good entrepreneur knows)
and just as quickly as it started, BlastOff! was gone.
The JPL engineers went back to JPL. The SmallSat
engineers went back to their small satellites (or bigger
ones) and the “Hollywood types” did whatever
Hollywood types do. I’m sure they are all making
exciting movies somewhere in the world today.

There was to be a contest to pick an individual to drive
one of the scout rovers on the lunar surface for 15
minutes from mission control HQ. There would be
others who got to drive the rovers, of course, but, not
for free. The list went on and on. There were even
serious discussions about carrying human cremation
remains to the surface of the moon, although the
intention was for them to stay in receptacles on the
underside of the mother spacecraft.
Things moved forward. As PDR was approaching (JPL
was hired as the independent review team) BlastOff!
purchased (made the first down-payment on) the last
remaining Athena launch vehicle from LockheedMartin. Propulsion systems, a structure, a coherent
ranging transponder and other critical mission
components were put under contract. In parallel, a
streaming video company was being launched because
Internet network technology was not yet up to the task
that BlastOff! had in mind for streaming video. Special
robotics experts were doing design trades and running
performance trials in the hallways of the BlastOff!
building in downtown Pasadena. Perhaps one of the
most exciting things about the process of creating the
lander/rover was that both serious spacecraft design
engineers AND Hollywood set designers were working
together…well sort of working together…to create the
system. First the real spacecraft engineers came up
with a design. The concept would then be handed over
to the “Hollywood spacecraft engineers” whose job it
was to make sure that the design was maximally
anthropomorphic and that there was enough room on
the bird for corporate logos to be placed. Then it went
back to the real spacecraft engineers again who would
carefully explain why the exterior surface of the
spacecraft couldn’t be painted candy apple red or why it
was not possible to spray paint a logo on the solar cell
cover slides. It was all tremendously stimulating work
for this team…right through the 23rd design iteration
sequence (literally) of the mother spacecraft. That took
about nine months. AND…then it happened. The
dot.com stock bubble burst in mid-2000. Within days
the Gross brothers lost a fortune in terms of the stock
value of their Idealab incubator companies. While
Spielberg and Cameron were willing to continue to
support the company, their support was not enough to
fund rocket launches and propulsion systems and so,
this grand idea and assembly of great people was in
serious trouble.
With only a month of money
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Now, this was an idea that should have been a dreamcome-true. It had success written all over it. All the
right people with all the right skills were together in the
same place and BlastOff! could muster support from
anywhere and everywhere it wanted. Everyone wanted
to help. The biggest problem that came up from timeto-time was keeping the company and the concept a
total secret. This was to be sprung upon the world as a
well thought-out process at precisely the right moment
to generate TOTAL excitement (and revenue). But, it
didn’t happen. The last thing that did happen before
BlastOff! shut-down was the construction of a full scale
model or prototype of the mother spacecraft. Several of
the team went to a nearby garage shop and molded
fiberglass body parts that were of the same shape as
Version 23 of the lander/rover. A complete mockup of
the spacecraft antennas, solar panels and propulsion
system were made. The wheels were not quite to
specification. Electric motors were installed on the
drive wheels so that the prototype, in fact, had motion.
Figures 14 - 16, I believe are never-before-actuallypublished photos of the BlastOff! mother rover/lander
prototype that might have eventually made history. The
rover mockup, I think, still lives in Bill Gross’s office at
Idealabs in Pasadena.
As the former Chief Technical Officer of BlastOff! I
was more than proud to have worked with such an
incredible team of multi-talented individuals. Every
day at BlastOff! was a blast. The excitement of the
project was palpable. One can only say, there may yet
be another opportunity; another chance for this dream
to catch hold; another space and time where and when
the conditions will be right for such an exciting activity
to take place.

38

25thAnnual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

So, if I’m asked if I think an entertainment spacecraft
could be commercially viable, I‘d say, history says NO

but, my heart say YES. So, when do we start!

Figure 14: Rover/Lander Top View Showing Propulsion System
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Figure 15: Aft View of Rover/Lander Showing High Gain Antenna

Figure 16: Rover/Lander During a U-Turn Driving Test
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this business (plus or minus a factor of 2). [NOTE: If
you are a Cubesat multiply this figure by X4 to X8.]
And, I think it will stay that way for a long time to
come. This cost too should be built into your business
plan. I would not bet my company on something
hugely significant happening in the next five to ten
years regarding launch cost.

5.0 CONSTRAINTS
Some things in life are not fair. So it can also be for
small satellite missions and business ventures. While
reasonable engineers and managers might disagree
about the definitions of “fair” or “unfair,” some aspects
of our business are just plain disagreeable. A definite
example of that would be the International Traffic in
Arms Regulations” (ITAR) but, I’m not going there
with this paper. Deal with it!

3) Just because the objects that aerospace engineers
create go into space and are gold plated or covered with
Kapton doesn’t change our human nature. People
pollute. Space debris is a unique form of pollution. It
isn’t every day on Earth that garbage travels past you at
between 1 and 15 km/second. So, this form of pollution
is really dangerous. It’s clear that this situation must,
and is changing.
Curiously, the Federal
Communicaitions Commission (FCC) is the agency in
the U.S. which now has the mandate to minimize
commercial space debris. Now when you file for a
transmitting license you also have to explain how you
will “take out the garbage” and eliminate your
spacecraft debris from orbit. This is a good thing. It
will cost money to clean up orbit space. I also
recommend that this be considered in the business plan,
the spacecraft system design and the operations
planning for your commercial system. I note that there
were multiple papers presented at the 8th Cubesat
Conference held at California Polytechnic Institute
earlier this year on the subject of space debris. Thus,
the message is getting out. This is good, because as a
space entrepreneur you will have to deal with it.

1) The first example which is a reasonable topic for
discussion is somewhat less polarizing than ITAR, but,
it is still harsh. That is the availability of radio
spectrum for space missions; all space missions. Small
satellite proponents have yet to deal squarely with this
issue but, as the goal here is to discuss commercial
missions, this issue becomes paramount and expensive.
Commercial users, nowadays, should even be prepared
to have to pay for the use of the radio spectrum once a
particular commercial application has shown itself to be
commercially viable. “Procurement” of new radio
spectrum for a project is a highly political process and it
takes a lot of time and it takes lawyers (and, therefore a
lot of money). One could spend volumes discussing
this issue. I will not do that here. What I would
strongly suggest is making sure that in the business plan
which is developed for your product you prominently
feature the cost of license procurement and the risk(s)
associated with not successfully obtaining the license
by the intended use date, should that eventuate.
2) Launch cost: Since the dawn of the space age,
telecommunications technology, in terms of bits
transmitted per second or data stored per spacecraft, has
improved by about 10 orders of magnitude. The
specific impulse of rocket engines, over that same
period of time, has improved by less than 25%. The
point is, not all technologies are equal and that has had
a huge impact on space system costs.
The
telecommunications improvement of 1010 is an
incentive to build telecommunications spacecraft. The
improvement in Isp of 25% or less in 50 years is a
disincentive to stay in the satellite business at all.
Savior companies have been going to provide a
windfall price improvement in launcher cost for a long
time. That too, has not transpired. My suggestion is
that $10,000 USD per Kg into orbit is the price of doing
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As I have alluded to, there are other space system
constraints that enter into business planning but, these
are the ones that are perhaps most important for the
immediate consideration of any serious space
entrepreneur planning a space venture or adventure.
6.0 CONCLUSIONS
I have thus exhausted my knowledge, opinions and
observations regarding the potential for commercial
small satellites to be successful and how companies
might go about doing so. Following is a summary table
of the key elements presented above. See Table 9.
I’ve worked and waited my whole life to find the first
small satellite break-away commercial technology – the
SmallSat “killer ap.” I’m still working and waiting.
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Table 9: Commercial Mission Success and Success Prospects
Commercial Mission
Application:
Telecommunications

Have SmallSats been
Commercially Successful in this
Application in the Past?
SOFT YES

Earth Imaging
Remote Sensing [Non-Imaging]
Science
Entertainment, Education, Training

Deep Space (Com., Science, Ent.)

YES
NO
NO
NO
NO

From Table 9: * I believe small satellites will dominate
this market within 10-15 years. Another quotation from
a Phil Davies’ (SSTL) Space News editorial from about
2 years ago, is still relevant today. 14:

Is the Prognosis for Success
Good in the Near Future?
Niche Markets Only;
Good Possibility

Yes, Considering Cost & Price *
Some Possibility
Some Possibility; Changes Required
Maybe. It’s worth a try!
Some Possibility; Changes Required
thanks to all of those individuals within our community
who have been keeping me up-to-date. My special
thanks for help in updating this paper go to Andrew
Kalman, Pumpkin, Inc.; Robert Twiggs, Moorehead
State College; Craig Clark, Clyde-Space; Gil Moore,
RAMPART Project Lead; Jim White, Colorado
Satellite; Joost Elstak, ISIS; Jordi Puig-Suari, Cal Poly;
and Rex Reidenoure, Ecliptic Enterprises, Inc.

“Considering all of these developments we are now
convinced that everything is in place to implement a
sub-meter resolution imaging mission using current
small satellite technology. To do so would lead to a
system costing less than $70 million to build, insure and
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